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PARTY EFFORTS IN COMBATING HOSTILE IDEOLOGY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 81 (signed to press 24 Feb 81) pp 3-9

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Col T. Kondratkov: "The CPSU on Further Intensifying the Offensive Struggle Against Hostile Ideology"]

[Text] The Materials of the 24th, 25th and 26th party congresses, the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee on ideological questions and the book by L. I. Brezhnev "Aktual'nyye voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty KPSS" [Timely Questions of CPSU Ideological Work] have elaborated an all-encompassing program of activities in the area of ideology, propaganda, the formation of the new man and they have raised the task of further strengthening the offensive struggle against bourgeois, Maoist and revisionist ideology. The subversive ideological activities of the class enemy must be opposed by unshakable solidarity, by the mighty ideological unity of the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy, by their profound ideological conviction, high political vigilance, immunity to the refined lies and slander of our enemies and by a readiness to unstintingly defend the motherland and the revolutionary victories of socialism.

The CPSU has constantly followed the instructions of V. I. Lenin about the class irreconcilability of bourgeois and communist ideologies. "...Bourgeois or socialist ideology," wrote Lenin. "There is no middle ground...."[1] "What sort of 'truce' could there be...it is silly to even mention this. A fight is absolutely inevitable...on this question there cannot be and will not be any neutrality."[2] The entire history of the struggle against bourgeois, opportunistic and revisionist ideology confirms the correctness of this Leninist thesis.

At the beginning of the 1980's, the ideological and political struggle on the international scene has become sharply aggrevated due to the leaders of the NATO bloc and primarily the United States. Imperialist propaganda which cooperates openly with the propaganda of the Beijing hegemonists is waging unabated "ideological warfare" against the Soviet citizens, it fiercely attacks their minds and feelings, it is endeavoring to poison the conscience of the Soviet people with slander about our reality, to blacken real socialism and to defame the historic victories achieved by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party. The French political writer P. Devillers in the book "Guerre ou Paix" [War or Peace] with cynical frankness has stated: "The ideological warfare unleashed by the West against communism is aimed at destabilizing Soviet society and fanning national hostility or tendencies toward embourgeoization."[3]

The ideology and policy of *anticommunism* and *anti-Sovietism* are profoundly reactionary, counterrevolutionary, antiscientific and permeated by pessimism. They show the ideological and political crisis of imperialism and the inability of its theoreticians to provide positive ideas and social ideals which are in any way attractive for the masses. The German writer Thomas Mann with full justification termed anticommunism the greatest stupidity of our age.[4]

Anticommunist ideology which is closely intertwined with nationalism and chauvinism, racism and religious mysticism, reformism and revisionism, has deeply penetrated the sociopolitical, ideological and cultural atmosphere in the capitalist nations. This is confirmed by the rampage of nationalism and racism in the United States which, in the expression of Gus Hall, is growing into a form of apartheid for 25 million black inhabitants of the nation. The revanchists and Neonazis in West Germany are becoming more active, militarism is undergoing a strong rebirth in Japan. Zionism is becoming more brazen and atrocities are being committed by the South African racists.

Modern anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are assuming an evermore militant nature. As was emphasized by the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "Anti-Sovietism and anticommunism have been turned into an instrument for increasing the arms race, into a weapon for combating not only the USSR and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth, not only against the communists but against all the opponents of war and peace-loving forces, and into a means for undermining detente."[5] For this reason the struggle against anti-Sovietism and anticommunism is the primary task of the communists, the democrats, all the supporters of strengthening and deepening international detente and the fighters for the peace and security of peoples.

The Soviet mass information and propaganda bodies, in being guided by the decisions of the party congress and the decrees of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, are carrying out a biune ideological task: in the first place, they are carrying out extensive active work aimed at decisively unmasking the ideology and policy of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism and at disclosing the true motives of the "ideological warfare" against the USSR and the fraternal nations which is incompatible with the generally accepted standards of international law. Secondly, they are carrying throughout the world the truth about the developed socialism, about our achievements and about Soviet foreign policy which combines a love of peace with a firm rejection of aggression. In this manner they are mobilizing the world community to support the proposals on the cardinal questions of international policy. The successes of their activities are being aided by the mass information and propaganda organs of the socialist countries.

The ideological struggle has acquired particular acuteness in determining the main question of today, the question of *war and peace*. The struggle completely involves this complicated problem and permeates all aspects of it. Contradictory viewpoints clash over its various aspects: Marxist-Leninist, on the one hand, and bourgeois, Maoist and revisionist, on the other. In bourgeois sociology which provides the ideological material for the imperialist propaganda machine, an entire area has arisen which is concerned with studying conflicts, wars and peace and with working out the concepts and doctrines which directly or indirectly rehabilitate war and establish its inevitability.

The ideologists of militarism justify armed violence in its most dangerous, misenthropic forms. War, including a nuclear one, is viewed by them as an acceptable weapon of aggressive policy and an applicable means for fighting against socialism and communism. They focus their efforts on undermining detente and sanctioning the use of the most destructive and devastating means for the sake of establishing their rule over the world.

The feverish military preparations and the propagandizing of war have reached an unprecedented scope and level primarily in the United States and the other NATO countries. Participating in this dirty campaign are not only the ideologists and propagandists but also highly placed political and military figures of the West. "With striking cynicism," stressed Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "they argue about starting a nuclear war as if this were something normal or even desirable and accustom the people to this criminal notion. A flood of provocative fabrications and evil slanders against the socialist countries, and particularly against the USSR, have literally inundated the United States, spreading out in all directions from there."[6]

There have been continuous attacks against the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war, and particularly about the relationship between war and politics. The "depoliticization" of war is a widespread form of its distortion by bourgeois ideologists. Directly or indirectly this is apparent in the attempts to separate war from the policies of classes and states and to reduce it to the process of extermination and destruction. Strategy is also interpreted in accord with this. The American admiral H. Eccles in the book "Military Power in a Free Society" has written that "strategy and destruction are synonyms."[7] The purpose of U.S. and NATO global strategy, in his opinion, is the unification and coordination of political, economic, ideological and military means for the "total" annihilation of the enemy population and armed forces.

In denying the link between war and politics, bourgeois ideologists endeavor to identify the latter with violence and this is characteristic primarily for the American school of political "realism," the representatives of which take a direct part in working out the foreign policy and military-strategic doctrines of the Unites States and NATO. International relations, in the opinion of one of the prominent representatives of this school, H. Kissinger, are a balance of forces while the carrying out of the policy of a balance of forces is a constant process without conclusion. "Detente," he writes, "can never eliminate the balance of forces: it can be the result of an equilibrium of forces but not its substitute."[8] This is a frank apology for violence dictated by the aggressive interests of monopolistic capital.

The ideological and theoretical concepts focused on the preparations for war have gained their embodiment in the foreign policy and military strategic doctrines of the United States and its allies. Confirmation of this is the "New Nuclear Strategy" approved by Directive No 59 of the former president J. Carter. On a official level it legitimizes nuclear war and legalizes the use of weapons of mass destruction in the interests of the aggressive policy of the United States and its partners. This adventuristic strategy which has been angrily condemned by broad sociopolitical circles throughout the world, increases the risk of nuclear war and makes it more probable.

The dangerous course of the United States and the other NATO countries is opposed by the nations of the socialist commonwealth with a broad program of actions aimed at eliminating the threat of the resumption of the "Cold War," strengthening confidence and mutual understanding in international relations and turning the course of events toward peaceful means. As was emphasized in the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact States adopted at the jubilee session of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1980, these nations "reaffirm that they have never endeavored and will not endeavor to attain military superiority; they are steadily in favor of achieving a military equilibrium on ever-lower levels and for reducing and eliminating the military confrontation in Europe. They do not have, have not had and will not have a strategic policy except a defensive one, there is no intention, there has not been and will not be one to create a first nuclear strike potential."[9]

Permeated with an unswerving will for peace, the policy of our state and the socialist community fully considers the interests of other countries and peoples. This is confirmed by the peace initiatives of the USSR. Convincing and vivid proof of this is the important proposals voiced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his visit to India in December 1980 and which point the way to ensuring a just and lasting peace in the Persian Gulf Area, one of the hot spots of our planet.

Along with overt action the imperialist propaganda machine also widely fosters a veiled apology of armed violence. These aims are pursued by the numerous bourgeois and opportunist theories permeated with a spirit of fatalism and the inevitability of war. Their heart is rabid anticommunism and anti-Sovietism and a voluntaristic negation of the ongoing development of society. The unmasking of these theories is an important area in the struggle against bourgeois, Maoist and revisionist ideology.

The *sociological* theories of war comprise the most widespread group. Their followers view the causes of wars in various social phenomena and processes which are interpreted in an idealistic manner, that is, in politics, national sovereignty, ideology and so forth. The bourgeois ideologists conceal the aggressive nature of imperialist policy and its reactionary essence and endeavor to prove that it is not related to a monopolistic capital economy. They slander the policy of the socialist countries, they accuse them of a desire for hegemony, they fan the false myth about a "Soviet military threat" and accuse the USSR of participating in "international terrorism."

The theory is also strongly fostered that in the modern age the existence of national sovereignty and of independent sovereign states and the growth of their number are a source of wars. According to this theory, wars will last as long as state and national sovereignty survive as this gives rise to anarchy in international relations. This anarchy is supposedly the main cause of armed conflicts.[10]

The supporters of this theory propose putting an end to state independence and to replace national instincts by a supranational cosmopolitan structure, that is, by a world state with a world government, parliament, courts, police, ministry of defense, general staff and so forth. Such a state should be erected on the ruins of the independent national states by the use of force. The West German philosopher and physicist, K. F. Weizsäcker, in the book "The Ways to Danger" writes that the development of mankind is leading to the "creation of an absolute world state by war and its subsequent liberalization."[11] This cosmopolitan Utopia has a frankly reactionary nature. It claims the role of an ideological counterweight to proletarian, socialist internationalism which has found its true embodiment in the common wealth of socialist states.

The fundamental cause of wars is not in state and national sovereignty but rather in the economic and political system of imperialism which attacks the latter. The Marxist-Leninists are against imperialist integration, aggressive military-political blocs and interference into the internal affairs of independent states as well as against the policy and ideology of national exclusiveness. They are in favor of equality of rights, the all-round and voluntary association and cooperation of nations, peoples and independent states for the sake of peace, democracy, socialism and communism.

Imperialist propaganda also fosters an idea that the ideological contradictions and struggle of ideas are the main source of military danger. It shifts the ideological differences into the area of international relations and views ideology as a primary factor causing armed conflicts. In actuality, ideological contradictions are not the primary ones, but rather are derivative from the economic and sociopolitical ones. The irreconcilability of ideological positions and the acute struggle between hostile ideologies do not exclude detente or peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems in the political, economic and other areas. It is important that the inevitable struggle in the sphere of ideology not devolve down into something fraught with dangerous conflicts and wars. "Of course, ideological disputes and the struggle of ideologies will continue," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "But we are against turning ideology into the servant of military staffs or the struggle of ideologies into psychological warfare. A peaceful, honest competition of ideas and social practice--this is our principle. People should not disclose their attitudes, including those on ideological questions, on the battlefield."[12]

Totally absurd are the arguments of those bourgeois and revisionist theoreticians who have endeavored to assert that the sources of modern wars lie in the very contradiction between the two opposing social systems which are equally to blame for the preparation and starting of wars. This applies particularly to the existence of the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR. These antiscientific arguments put an equal sign between the imperialist and socialist states, they obliterate the difference between them, they skip over the question of the guilty parties in unleashing wars and armed conflicts and obscure the class awareness of the masses. There cannot be the same attitude toward states which are qualitatively opposite in their nature, for force in the hands of the United States and its partners means the danger of unleashing local wars and a world-wide nuclear war; but force in the hands of the USSR and the socialist countries is a factor ensuring peace and the salvation of mankind from a nuclear catastrophe.

In recent years one can observe the rebirth of the *biological* approach to war. The supporters of the theories preaching this have extended the laws of development in the animal world to human society. Two premises rest at the basis of their views: 1) man is a part of nature, a biological being inclined to murder the representatives of his own species; 2) war is a biological phenomenon the roots of which lie in genes and in blood. The English sociologist J. Lider in the book "On the Nature of War" has written that of all the factors determining the causes of war, the biological factor is the basic one and its influence has been greatly underestimated.[13]

The biological group also includes the following theories: *Social Darwinism* which considers wars an outgrowth of natural selection and the struggle for existence which are supposedly innate to people to the same degree as to animals; *racist* which views the sources of war in the existence of the eternal hostility between various races and nations; *neo-Malthusian* which explains the causes of wars by the "excessive fertility" of people and by the "catastrophic growth of the world's population." Here also would be found the *geopolitical* which justifies aggression by a lack of "living space."

The goal and class purpose of these theories are to perpetuate armed violence, to remove the responsibility from the imperialist circles from the preparations for and starting up of devastating wars, to shift this to the biological nature of man and to prove the absurdity of the struggle against the danger of war.

V. I. Lenin at one time emphasized that the playing with biological terms and the transposing of biological concepts into the area of the social sciences are an empty phrase, a futile scholastic, dead undertaking.[14] Lenin's ideas are pertinent under today's conditions as well, when the bourgeois ideologists are attempting to depict war as the outgrowth of man's genetic nature and thereby ennoble the guilty party of the bloody wars, imperialism.

Imperialist propaganda also widely uses the group of the *psychological* theories of war for spreading militaristic views. Their representatives view the human psyche as something unchanged and self-contained. They put instincts and inclinations for war in the forefront. Man in their understanding is a group of destructive instincts, the main one being aggressiveness. This supposedly is the fundamental cause of wars. "War and peace," asserts the West German sociologist P. Wacker, "are a human matter.... And in order to strengthen peace, to make it inevitable, it is essential to change the essence of man."[15]

It is quite obvious that the problem of war and peace can be solved fundamentally not by a basic reorganization of human nature but primarily by revolutionary transformations of the antagonistic social relationships and by replacing them with socialist ones. This will lead to a change in the position of people in society and to a rebirth of their spiritual and psychological make-up. The new society creates a completely different type of man, a steadfast defender of socialism and the fighter for peace and security for peoples.

In the propaganda arsenal of the militarists, the *technocratic* theories hold an important place and according to them the danger of devastating wars lies supposedly in technology and science. Their proponents assert that modern technology and science have become a "demonic" force which threatens the future of mankind. The American sociologist E. Fromm in his book "The Revolution of Hope" writes that among people there roams the specter of technicism which turns man into the impotent appendage of a machine and leads to his destruction in a nuclear war. For escaping from the blind alley, Fromm proposes to resurrect "radical humanism and faith," to carry out a "humanization of technology" and renew the technicist society "spiritually."[16]

Such a philosophy conceals the true causes of wars and distracts the attention of the working masses from the struggle against the reactionary, militaristic forces in order to free them from the yoke of capital, to subordinate scientific and technical progress to the interests of all society and to preserve peace among peoples. Here the fact is overlooked that precisely the capitalist system and its socioeconomic and political structure have given a distorted, militaristic nature to the development of science and technology and have caused a race of nuclear missile and conventional weapons. As long as imperialism exists mankind cannot be confident of its future.

The sociological, biological, psychological and technocratic theories of war in a concentrated form reflect the crisis of these theories. The main failure of all these theories is the abandonment of a scientific, class approach without which it is impossible to solve such an important problem.

In endeavoring to overcome the one-sidedness of the theories which search for the sources of wars in a single phenomenon or process, bourgeois sociology has latched onto the methodology of *pleuralism* or a multiplicity of causes and factors giving rise to wars. The supporters of a pleuralistic methodology view all sociopolitical theories and research methods as equally valid, relative and having the same rights to the search for truth. They intentionally overlook the qualitative distinction between scientific and unscientific methods of cognition and foster "methodological anarchy."

The only correct, truly scientific explanation of the sources of the danger of war is provided by Marxist-Leninist science. The roots of war lie in the exploiting method of production and in the economic and sociopolitical system based upon private ownership and the exploitation of man by man. In our times American imperialism and its partnership with Chinese hegemonism are the main reactionary force of the modern world and the basic source of a danger of war.

The workers on the ideological front must decisively unmask the ideological subversion of our enemies, they must give a worthy rebuff to the falsifiers of Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army, they must help develop in the men an irreconcilability for the enemies of socialism and communism. They must teach the personnel to correctly understand modern military theoretical problems and indoctrinate them in a spirit of high political awareness.

Inspired by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and totally dedicated to the Communist Party and the socialist motherland, the Soviet military in close formation with the men of the fraternal Warsaw Pact armies, are vigilantly standing the combat watch to defend the historic victories of socialism, peace and security of peoples.

FOOTNOTES

[1] V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 6, p 39.

[2] Ibid., Vol 47, p 151.

[3] P. Devillers, "Guerre ou Paix" [War or Peace], Paris, 1979, p 133.

[4] Bourgeois anticommunist ideologists have endeavored to refute this apt description in every possible way. In particular, such an attempt was undertaken by the West German sociologist P. Dittman in his book "Anticommunism: Absurdity or Necessity?" (1979).

[5] PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

[6] PRAVDA, 17 October 1980.

[7] H. Eccles, "Military Power in a Free Society," Newport, Rhode Island, 1979, p 73.

[3] H. Kissinger, "White House Years," Boston, 1979, p 1143.

[9] PRAVDA, 16 May 1980.

[10] R. Ashley, "The Political Economy of War and Peace," London, New York, 1980, p 260.

[11] C. F. Weizsäcker, "Wege in die Gefahr," Munich-Wein, 1977, p 114.

[12] PRAVDA, 6 May 1978.

[13] J. Lider, "On the Nature of War," England, 1977, p 6.

[14] See V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 18, p 348.

[15] P. Wacker, "Philosophische Lösungen...," Frankfurt/Main, 1979, p 101.

[16] E. Fromm, "Die Revolution der Hoffnung," Hamburg, 1979, pp 9, 81, 112.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: INFORMATION PROCESSING BY STAFFS

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen A. Yevseyev and Col O. Gurov: "Organization of Information Work in the General Staff and the Staffs of Fronts and Armies"]

[Text] The Great Patriotic War has provided rich experience in organizing information handling by all levels of command and staffs. It confirmed that many control processes, and above all decision taking for combat, an operation or campaign, depend largely upon the content, completeness and reliability of information as well as on its promptness. In preparing and conducting combat operations, information was sent from the subordinate troops and staffs to the higher levels of command in the form of various reports, summaries and briefs, while moving from above downwards were directives, orders, instructions, operational guidelines and so forth. The aggregate of measures carried out by the command, the political bodies and staffs in collecting, processing and transmitting information needed for troop leadership comprised the basic content of information work by the command bodies.

The theoretical bases of information work in the Soviet Army began to develop after the Civil War. Thus, the 1925 RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Field Manual emphasized the importance of prompt submission, completeness and correctness of the obtained information in troop control. The Provisional Regulation on the Field Service of Troops Staffs issued in 1935 contained a special chapter entitled "Reports and Information." It gave the basic provisions for organizing information in a combat situation and defined the content of information documents and the procedure and dates for submitting these to superior staffs. Responsibility for the collection, processing and prompt submission of information was entrusted to the staffs.

The regulation indicated the types of periodic and aperiodic information documents. These were reports to a superior staff, the operational and intelligence summaries, reports on the effective troop strength, losses, the status of communications and a whole number of others. Information procedures were set for the inferior staffs, troops and adjacent units. Signals delegates services were provided for the purposes of ensuring reciprocal information.

The 1941 Regulation on Field Service of Red Army Staffs made the necessary clarifications and supplements on many questions of organizing information in preparing and conducting combat operations. Particular attention was paid to the reliability, correctness and promptness of the submitted information.

Thus, by the start of the war there was a basis for the organization of information work. However, not all questions as yet had been resolved on theoretical and practical levels.

Information in the General Staff

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff did not include a special body concerned exclusively with information questions. These questions were solved by the Operations Preparation Section of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff.

With the start of the war, the information situation became more complex, particularly due to the fact that enemy aviation and sabotage groups had destroyed many communications centers and lines. During the first days of the war, a difficult situation developed on the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern fronts. Army Gen S. M. Shtemenko emphasized that in the initial period "one of the bottlenecks was communications with the fronts, primarily the Western."[1] Under these conditions, the General Staff workers often obtained the needed information not over the military communications lines but rather over the communications channels of civilian departments. However, they resorted to such forms of obtaining information only in the first months of the war.

On the basis of the reports obtained from all the fronts, an information system was organized in the General Staff, the central directorates of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] and Hq SHC [Headquarters, Supreme High Command]. The chief of the operations directorate in July 1941 established and later in August clarified the procedure and time for operational guidelines, and in accord with this each day to 0800 and 2000 hours, the operational summaries were to be compiled and signed by the chief of the operations directorate. These were distributed to the members of the GKO [State Defense Committee] and Hq SHC, to the deputies of the NKO as well as to other people's commissariats related to the support of the army and navy. Statements for the informburo [information bureau] were also sent out daily by 0830 and 2030 hours. These briefly gave the general situation on the Soviet-German Front and indicated the major events within the limits of what was permissible for publication in the open press and radio broadcasts.

The operational guidelines within the General Staff and the NKO were given, as a rule, verbally. These were conducted daily from 2200 to 2300 hours by the chief of the Operational Preparation Section and for questions of the rear services, by the chief of the Section for the Control of the Operational Rear Organization of the General Staff.

As of March 1942, within the operations directorate there was set up an information section which at the end of the war had developed into a directorate. Regardless of the fact that many directorates of the General Staff and the central directorates of the NKO were involved to one degree or another in information work, its basic portion was performed by the Information Section. It prepared reports, operational summaries as well as releases for the press and radio. The working out of the points of the operational summary by the General Staff for each front was entrusted to the corresponding chiefs of the sectors with assistance from the officers of the Information Section. Wrap-up reports were ordinarily submitted to Hq SHC by the General Staff three times a day. When necessary emergency statements were also sent. "...Later all of this was accumulated in the daily operational summary.... The summary described the course of combat operations on all fronts down to the division inclusively...."[2]

The reports of the General Staff chief or his deputy to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [SCINC] as a rule were made three times a day.[3] Moreover, for him maps were prepared with the situation on each front and a summary map for all the fronts. These were revised as necessary. Each individual front also submitted wrap-up reports to Hq SHC.

The chief commands of the strategic sectors set up at the outset of the war did not have any noticeable impact on the organization work as they did not have the corresponding information bodies and the required means of communications. During the period that they functioned, Hq SHC and the General Staff received data on the situation directly from the fronts. From 1942, the briefings and reports from the representatives of Hq SHC took up an ever-greater place in informing the Supreme High Command [SHC] about the situation on the fronts. From them the SCINC "demanded daily briefings or reports on the course of preparation and conduct of operations. Particularly important situational estimates and proposals on new operations, upon the instructions of I. V. Stalin, were written out by hand in just one copy.... If for any reason briefings were not received within 24 hours from the Headquarters representatives, the SCINC himself phoned them over the high-frequency links."[4] Hq SHC and the General Staff also endeavored to constantly keep the commanders of the fronts informed of the general strategic situation. "In preparing a campaign, Headquarters, without revealing its essence, without fail informed the commanders of the fronts of their specific tasks stemming from the general plan of forthcoming actions."[5]

During the war years, the corps of General Staff representative officers played an important role in supplying the General Staff with information on the situation on the fronts. In the summer of 1943, this corps replaced the special group of liaison officers which had existed since 1941 and provided communications with the troops (the staffs of fronts, armies, corps and divisions). Among their other duties were: providing the General Staff with prompt and accurate information on the situation, the course of combat operations and the state of the troops; supervision and the check of execution of directives and orders in the troops; the strengthening of direct and constant contact of the corps of officers with the staffs and troops. The briefings and reports received from these officers in the operational army on the major questions of preparing and conducting an operation and combat were frequently used in the information summaries, orders and directives of Hq SHC and the General Staff as well as in working out the regulations and manuals.[6]

In the course of the war, there was also reciprocal information exchanged between the General Staff and the Allies in the anti-Nazi coalition. This was carried out by a special directorate. It was headed by Gen N. V. Slavin. In terms of their content, contacts with the Allies "basically came down to providing reciprocal information on the course of military operations, the exchange of war experience, certain intelligence data and technical innovations."[7]

Hq SHC and the General Staff gave great significance to studying the advanced experience of the war and to introducing it into troop practice. In 1941 and in the first half of 1942, this experience was issued to the troops in the form of orders from Hq SHC and instructions worked out by the staffs of the commanders of the Armed Services and branches of forces and by the staffs of the fronts and armies. In April 1942, sections were set up in the General Staff and the Chief Staff of the Navy and departments for the use of wartime experience were organized in the staffs of the fronts, armies and fleets. These newly created subdivisions were to study and generalize the experience of engagements and operations, on the basis of this to draw conclusions which would be useful for troop operations and promptly issue this to the commanders and staffs. The section for the use of wartime experience of the General Staff was also entrusted with organizing the elaboration of various instructions, manuals and combined-arms regulations. In March 1944, it became the directorate for the use of wartime experience and its functions were significantly broadened. In addition to collections of materials on studying wartime experience, the directorate also began to put out information bulletins and collections of tactical examples.

The war fully confirmed the need to generalize and promptly issue to the troops the valuable experience of engagements and operations, the best procedures and methods of combat operations of the units, formations and field forces of the Armed Services and branches of troops as well as extensive propagandizing of the heroic feats of the soldiers, sergeants and officers.

The Organization of Information in the Fronts and Armies

With the start of the war, substantial shortcomings were disclosed in the information system of the fronts and armies. The staffs of the field forces had poor practical skills in organizing information handling and as a consequence of this were unable to sufficiently provide the superior command bodies, the subordinate troops and adjacent units with prompt and reliable data on the situation.

The lack of the necessary practical skills in organizing information work was aggravated by a significant shortage of means of communications. At the start of the war the staffs of the fronts and armies had a significant lack of radios, the existing ones were unable to operate on the move and their range in a telephone mode was short. Thus, on the Southwestern Front at the very outset of the war, communications "were based upon the permanent wire lines of the People's Commissariat of Communications. But these, naturally, were widely known, and the Nazis from the very first hours of the war sent both their aviation and sabotage detachments against them. There were not enough forces to quickly eliminate the damage.... The lines connecting the command posts of the front with the center operated tolerably well. But it was terribly difficult to contact the army staffs."[8] For this reason, the command and the staffs of the fronts and many armies, as a consequence of the disrupted communications with their subordinate troops, were unable to gain, particularly during the first hours of the war, a sufficiently complete idea about the events developing on the front. The collection and generalization of situational data were carried out extremely slowly. Information on the enemy and friendly troops often was of an extremely contradictory nature. "Due to the frequent disruptions of communications," wrote Arm Gen S. M. Shtemenko, "we did not always know the situation with the required level of detail. The staffs of the fronts also complained about the unsatisfactory state of communications. For this reason, if we did succeed in contacting them, we still did not obtain sufficiently complete information about the status of the troops."[9]

The loss of communications, the frequent poor knowledge of the actual course of events and the true position and state of the troops on the part of the commanders and staffs of the fronts and armies sometimes led to the taking of decisions which did not always correspond to the actually existing situation, to a delayed response to the course of combat operations and to the untimely taking of measures to restore disrupted cooperation.

Regardless of the extremely difficult and complex situation, Hq SHC undertook every measure to establish uninterrupted communications with the subordinate staffs and ensure the obtaining of prompt and reliable information on all levels of control. For these purposes, in August 1941, there was put into effect the "Regulation Governing the Work of Front Headquarters" which obliged the command of the fronts to submit daily to the General Staff wrap-up reports and operational summaries no later than 0200 hours while reports of particular importance were to be submitted personally to the deputy chief of the General Staff on duty.

A firm procedure for submitting information documents was established also in the fronts and armies. Each day by 0400 hours the armies were to submit to the staff of a front information on the situation over the signature of the deputy chief of the operations section, and by 0800, 1300 and 1800 hours, the wrap-up reports over the signature of the chief of staff and the chief of the operations section. By 2100 hours, the wrap-up report was submitted to the military council of the front over the signature of the commander, the member of the military council and the chief of staff of the army. The same procedure was established also for intelligence information. However, data on the appearance of new enemy formations, its going over to an offensive or a retreat were reported immediately.[10] Here all possible channels were used for the information (wire communications, radio, mail, the Baudot system, high frequency, aviation and so forth) in strictly observing the rules of covert troop control.

Even the first months of the war showed that under the conditions of broad fluid actions and frequent and abrupt situational changes, Hq SHC should have contact not only with the fronts but also with the armies. For this reason, in September 1941, an order was issued on the organizing of direct telephone connections through the staffs of the fronts with each army staff. This was to be done by the chief of the Main Signals Directorate of the Red Army. The commanders of the fronts were obliged to immediately turn over their available communications with the armies for establishing direct calls between Hq SHC and the army staffs as well as link up with the army radio stations when they were called by the SHC radios.[11] Hq SHC also demanded that the military councils of the field forces make the fullest possible use of all available radio equipment for control and to decisively prevent the fear of using the radio. Thus, the radio was gradually turned into the basic means of communications in troop control.

In the second and third periods of the war, the increase in the flow of information on the combat situation and the qualitative changes in its content became a phenomenon which stemmed from the very practice of combat operations, that is, it had a completely natural and inevitable nature. The reliability of data on the combat situation was an indispensable condition for successful leadership of the units, formations and field forces. There was a change in the nature of information also with the adjacent units, particularly in conducting combat operations to encircle enemy groupings. For coordinating actions and for avoiding hitting one's own troops, concrete, precise and the most recent data on the combat situation were demanded from the adjacent units. The extensive scope of the partisan movement also obliged the command and combined-arms staffs to organize and maintain cooperation with them.

In the second and third periods of the war, the improvement of staff structure aided largely in further improving information work. Groups of sector representatives were incorporated as part of the operations departments on the staffs of the fronts and armies. Their basic duties were: a constant and detailed knowledge of the situation and state of the formations and field forces assigned to them, the recent situational data, the needs of the troops, the locations of the command posts as well as issuing them the set tasks and implementing control over their execution. A group of sector representatives was headed by the chief of a sector usually appointed from among the best trained officers of an operations section. With the appearance of these groups, the multiplicity of levels was reduced, the time for collecting information was foreshortened and parallelism in work was eliminated. The positions of liaison officers were introduced in the combined-arms staffs. Their duties included the prompt and accurate briefing (information) on the situation, the issuing of combat tasks to the troops and control over their execution.

The reorganization of the forms and methods of troop control on the basis of the requirements of the 1942 Manual for Staff Field Service and the draft of the 1943 Field Manual had a great impact upon improving information work. "Each staff and staff commander," pointed out the manual, "should use every opportunity to inform the higher staff, the subordinate staffs and adjacent units of all the situational data."[12] The demands were increased on the prompt presentation of information. Thus, on 8 January 1943, the SCINC telegraphed to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Gen Arm I. V. Tyulenev: "The third day is over and you have not provided data on the fate of your tank and cavalry groups. You have become separated from your troops and lost contact with them.... Such a situation is intolerable. I oblige you to restore contact with the mobile units of the Northern Group and regularly, twice a day, inform the General Staff of the state of affairs on your front...."[13]

In accord with the requirements of the new manuals, leadership over the compiling of situational data was entrusted to the chiefs of staff. The chiefs of the branches of troops and services were obliged to seek the approval of the chief of staff on the basic measures to collect and study situational data and submit the required information to the combined arms staff. The staff, in turn, was to promptly inform them of all changes in the combat situation.

In implementing the decisions of Hq SHC, on 1 August 1943, the General Staff put into effect a new table of periodic reports. It provided that by 2400 hours the SCINC was to receive daily wrap-up reports by the military councils of the fronts and separate armies and in addition the staffs of the fronts were to submit various summaries and reports to the General Staff. Some of these have been organized by us into a table.

Who Receives Report 1	Type of Report 2	Filing Time 3
Chief of General Staff	Operations guidelines	Three times a day by 1000, 1600 and 2000 hours
Chief of operations directorate	a) Operations summary;	Daily by 0800 hours (as of 2400 hours of the previous day)
	b) Summary of enemy losses and captured equipment	Three times a month by the 1st, 10th and 20th
	c) Summary of our troops' casualties	Three times a month by the 1st, 10th and 20th
	d) Copy of combat operations logs	By the 15th for the previous month
To chief of section (as of 1944, directorate) for the use of wartime experience	Brief summary of generalized experience of combat operations and new methods of employing branches of troops, combat equipment and types of weapons	Monthly by the 20th
To chief of intelligence directorate	a) Intelligence summary;	Daily by 0600 hours
	b) Intelligence report	Twice a day by 1200 and 2100 hours
	c) Final 10-day intelligence summary	Three times a month by the 2d, 12th and 22d
Chief of organization and records directorate	Report on effective and numerical strength	Monthly as of the 1st of the month
Chief of fortified areas section	Report on the state of building fortified areas	Twice a month by the 1st and 15th

In addition to the documents indicated in the table, the table provided for the submission of 10 types of reports to the chief of the intelligence directorate, 15 types of reports to the chief of the organizational and records directorate, several-score summaries and reports on various questions of operational and rear support to the other directorates of the General Staff.[14]

During active combat operations information was submitted by the army staffs to the fronts every 2-4 hours. The information was immediately plotted on the working charts of the operations directorate and of the chief of staff of the front and was simultaneously forwarded to the observation posts and the information section for preparing reports to the General Staff.[15] The entire process of assembling the situational data from the armies was usually carried out from the command posts of the fronts and armies by the sector officers.

The internal information on the combat situation was also systematized at the control posts of the field forces, the subordinate formations and units and adjacent units. For this a group of information officers was assigned from the operations and intelligence sections of the front and army staffs and they worked in close contact with the sector officers. As a result there was a significant increase in the amount of information on the combat situation and its content was changed qualitatively while the time and periodicity of receiving it were sharply reduced.

For the purposes of restricting the number of persons following the operational situation and keeping records for the effective and numerical strength of the troops, Hq SHC ordered that full data be available only in the operations sections (departments) of the combined-arms staffs and in the NKO on the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. The necessary operations guidelines for all commanders (chiefs) of the branches of troops (services) were turned out by the chief of the operations sections of the combined-arms staffs and at the NKO by the chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff.[16]

Thus, the systematizing of information handling on the staffs of the fronts and armies was aimed at eliminating parallelism and duplication in the assembly and processing of information as well as at ensuring precise mutual exchange of information between the control bodies through the comprehensive use of the diverse sources and methods of obtaining situational data. It became a firm practice to have personal contact between the commanders and subordinates. All of this helped to increase the directness and improve the qualitative content of the information. By the achieving of brevity and preciseness of statements as well as by using standard documents forms, their volume was reduced and the communications channels were freed.

The system elaborated by combat practice of submitting combat documents by the front and army staffs proved fully effective and existed without essential changes almost to the end of the war. Only at the beginning of 1945 were certain adjustments incorporated in the table of periodic reports. In particular, instead of the operations guidelines the staffs of the fronts and separate armies were to file daily wrap-up reports by 1000, 1500 and 2200 hours. A number of new reports were introduced for the armored and engineer troops and for the units of the fortified areas.

Many of the most important development trends in the theory and practice of information handling on the strategic and operational control levels, as they evolved during the years of the Great Patriotic War, have not lost their importance at present.

The war clearly showed that one of the reasons for the unsatisfactory state of information between the General Staff and the front and army staffs at the outset of the war was the lack of means of communications for the staffs and troops and the absence of special information organs which were properly prepared to perform their functional duties. These organs were created and gained experience in the course of military operations but during the first days of the war this had a negative impact upon the quality of troop leadership on all levels of control.

In a modern war, if the aggressive imperialist forces succeed in starting it, under the conditions of the sharply increased scope and pace of military operations and the diversity of employed men and equipment, there inevitably will arise, we feel, the necessity of collecting operational, sufficiently complete and reliable information from even greater expanses than in the previous war and a further shortening of the time for its processing and issuing to the interested control bodies. At the same time with the outset of armed combat there may not be time to reorganize the information system let alone create it. For this reason, even in peacetime it is important to organize an ordered information system, to create the corresponding bodies, to train them well to perform their duties with the start of military operations and to supply all the modern technical means for assembling, processing, displaying and issuing the situational data to the concerned levels.

For the purposes of ensuring high efficiency in informing all levels of command and staffs under present-day conditions, in our opinion, the following is required: to use a centralized method for the collection, processing and issuing of information; to establish and strictly observe a scientifically based periodicity for the forwarding of situational data to the superior bodies considering the importance and urgency of the data; to determine the optimum degree of detailing (the scope) of information for each situational element. The documenting of information with the extensive use of equipment for this has also assumed important significance.

Centralizing the collection and processing of situational data makes it possible to avoid duplication and their handling by multiple levels, to exclude excessive requests from the staffs and lower the load on the communications channels. As the experience of the past war shows, this can be achieved by establishing at the control posts staff information centers or groups which have direct, dependable and high-speed communications with the corresponding sources. The most radical way to solve this problem would be the introduction of the corresponding automated facilities for the collection, processing, display and turning out of information.

The periodic receipt of situational data combined with centralization is essential for regulating, systematizing and reducing the volume of information flows. A clear determination of the periodicity can ensure that the control units and officials promptly receive the amount of data which will best ensure the high quality execution of their tasks relating to troop control.

An optimum degree of detailing for the volume of data on each situational element can be achieved by determining the rational content of the extremely essential information on the existing situation, the excluding of superfluous or nonessential information and the standardizing of the content of information documents. This will make it possible to reduce their volume, the time spent on working out and transmitting the information over the communications equipment as well as the time spent on studying and analyzing the information in the superior control bodies.

FOOTNOTES

[1] S. M. Shtemenko, "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" [The General Staff in the War Years], Book 1, 2d Edition, Voyenizdat, 1975, p 31.

[2] Ibid., p 193.

[3] For the sequence of briefings, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1981, p 18.

[4] G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections], Vol 1, 2d Edition, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1974, p 326.

[5] Ibid., p 332.

[6] TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 358, inv. 5929, file 107, sheet 12.

[7] S. M. Shtemenko, op. cit., Book 2, 1974, p 21.

[8] I. Kh. Bagramyan, "Tak nachinalas' voyna" [So Commenced the War], 2d, Revised Edition, Voyenizdat, 1977, p 88.

[9] S. M. Shtemenko, op. cit., Book 1, p 31.

[10] TsAMO, folio 241, inv. 2593, file 1, sheet 22.

[11] Ibid., folio 132-A, inv. 2642, file 30, sheet 31.

[12] "Nastavleniye po polevoy sluzhbe shtabov Krasnoy Armii" [Manual on Red Army Staff Field Service], Voyenizdat, 1942, p 12.

[13] TsAMO, folio 3, inv. 11556, file 12, sheet 21.

[14] Ibid., folio 16-A, inv. 1026, file 1, sheets 39-42.

[15] Ibid., folio 288, inv. 9929, file 3, sheet 12.

[16] Ibid., folio 48-A, inv. 2, file 8, sheet 143.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: FRONT AND ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR TROOP CONTROL

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col A. Bazhenov: "Trends in the Development of the Organizational Structure of Control Organs of the Fronts and Armies"]

[Text] Under present-conditions, due to the enormous changes brought about by the scientific and technical revolution in all areas of military affairs, the demands on troop control have grown extremely. For this reason the further development of the organizational forms of the control bodies and the improvement of work methods by all levels of commanders and staffs are urgent problems of military theory and practice.

The use of the experience of past wars plays a certain role in improving the system of the troop control bodies. The aim of the present article is to examine the development of the staff organizational structures of the field headquarters of the fronts and the combined arms armies in the course of the Great Patriotic War and to bring out the major trends in this process which have maintained their importance for today's theory and practice.

The changes in the organizational structure of the operational control bodies during the war were largely determined by the fluctuations in the effective and numerical strength of the fronts and the armies and by the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the weapons and equipment. They were also dictated by the nature of armed combat and by the existing situation on the battlefields and were caused by the chosen types and methods of combat operation as well as by the availability and capabilities of the control equipment. As is known, the quantity of men and equipment in the field forces was not constant and directly depended upon the tasks being carried out by them. Thus, in the course of the war the fronts included from 2 to 11 combined-arms armies, and from the summer of 1942, also air and tank armies.[1] With the changing of the national economy over to a wartime footing and with the increase in weapon production, the level of the technical equipping of the Soviet troops rose constantly. While the major front offensive operations in 1941-1942 involved around 30 rifle divisions, 200-900 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], 2,000-3,000 guns and mortars and 200-400 aircraft, in 1944-1945, the numbers were from 65 to 77 rifle divisions, more than 13,000-14,000 guns and mortars, 2,000-3,000 tanks and SAU and over 2,000-3,000 aircraft.[2]

With the quantitative and qualitative growth of the troops, the fronts (armies) became more and more complex troop organisms and their combat capabilities increased sharply. All of this, considering the nature of military operations, necessitated an improvement in the forms and methods of leadership over the men and equipment on the battlefields.

An intensive search for the most effective structure of control bodies was carried out during the entire Great Patriotic War. Certain data shown in Table 1 provides some notion about the nature and scale of this work. As a total major changes in the staffs of the field headquarters of the fronts were carried out six times, and for the armies four times.

The last prewar TOE [table of organization and equipment] for the front control bodies was approved by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense on 12 June 1941, and in the army bodies on 13 September 1940. At the head of a front (army) was the military council which bore full responsibility for the political-moral state, the combat readiness and activities of the troops. The commander of the field force headed this body. Directly under him was the staff, 8 directorates (in an army, section): political, propaganda, air force, artillery, armored vehicle-tank, engineer, signals, air defense, intendant and 8 independent sections: airborne landing service (this did not exist on the army level), military training, chemical warfare, medical, fuel supply, veterinary, finance and personnel.[3] The organizational structure of the field headquarters during the prewar years as a whole met the requirements of World War II which had broken out in the west and which differed from previous wars in the mass use of aircraft, tanks, artillery and other military equipment. On the basis of the plan and instructions of the commander of a front (army), the planning and use of the basic resources in an operation were carried out by special bodies, for example on a front, by the staff, the air force, artillery, armored vehicle-tank and other directorates.

At the same time, the designated structure did not ensure a clear delimitation of the operational and supporting functions between the various control bodies. The commanders of field forces and the chiefs of the branches of troops and special troops (services) were forced to spend a great deal of time and energy on solving the problems of logistical support for combat operations and could not focus attention on questions of an operational nature. Moreover, centralization was lacking in the leadership of the rear services as this area was the concern of the staff, the intendant directorate (a section in an army) and the fuel supply, medical, veterinary and finance sections.

From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the particular features for the functioning of all levels of the field headquarters began to become apparent and the range and scope of tasks carried out by them grew broader. This required the bringing of the control bodies into accord with these particular features. In the aim of increasing responsibility for the results of troop combat operations, by a party and government decision, in July 1941, the directorates (sections) for political propaganda of the fronts (armies) were transformed into political directorates (sections). For improving leadership over the rear units and facilities, in August 1941, the rear services directorate was introduced while the front medical section became the medical directorate. The air force section was abolished in an army field headquarters. The sections concerned with the problems of organizing rear

Table 1

Changes in TOE Structure of Field Headquarters of Fronts (Armies) during Years of Great Patriotic War*

Elements of Organizational Structure**	Number of Personnel			
	Prewar TOE	Sep 1941 TOE	Mar 1942 TOE	Jun 1944 TOE
Military council	11 (5)	8 (6)	8 (7)	11 (9)
Staff	333 (177)	277 (95)	362 (98)	333 (104)
Political directorate (section)	...***	112 (...)	123 (...)	124 (51)
Directorate of artillery commander	78 (44)	54 (34)	99 (42)	103 (55)
Directorate of armored and motorized troops commander	41 (19)	29 (16)	45 (17)	58 (11)
Engineer directorate (section)	50 (6)	27 (8)	25 (5)	29 (8)
Signals directorate (section)	72 (12)	41 (14)	49 (13)	56 (20)
Air defense directorate (section)	21 (5)	20 (4)	13 (3)	--
Chemical warfare directorate (section)	15 (3)	10 (9)	13 (6)	20 (5)
Chief of rear, rear bodies	224 (100)	248 (121)	301 (118)	375 (142)
Captured weapons directorate (section)	--	--	--	29 (15)
Combat training section	13 (4)	5 (2)	7 (2)	--
Airborne landing service section	15 (-)	--	--	--
Personnel section	52 (17)	33 (16)	32 (13)	35 (14)
Cavalry inspectorate	--	--	9 (-)	--
Military prosecutor	--	--	--	22 (10)
Military tribunal	--	--	--	18 (8)
General Indicators				
Number of bodies directly subordinate to commander, units	18 (17)	18 (16)	21 (17)	13 (14)
Total personnel	925 (392)	864 (325)	1086 (324)	1213 (452)
Including civilian employees	55 (35)	69 (25)	140 (32)	210 (61)

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*The table was compiled from the materials of the TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 229, inv. 159, file 21, sheets 8-45; folio 209, inv. 1098, file 1, sheets 88-106; folio 213, inv. 2009, file 6, sheets 129-144; folio 233, inv. 2324, file 5, sheets 95-119; folio 382, inv. 8447, file 14, sheets 172-180; folio 357, inv. 5973, file 11, sheets 643-652, 663-673; folio 317, inv. 4334, file 109, sheets 199-218.

**The names of the elements in the organizational structure have been given according to the June 1944 TOE. The army figures are given in the parentheses.

***Data not available.

services, supply, road services the transporting of troops and materiel were excluded from the combined-arms staffs. All of this was reflected in the new TOE introduced on 19 September 1941.[4]

A characteristic feature of the new TOE was the significant reduction in the number of personnel. This was a compulsory measure. It was caused by the losses of Soviet troops in the summer of 1941, by the acute lack of command personnel, by the necessity of organizing new operational field forces and so forth. The smallest number of personnel in the front and army control bodies was established for the TOE approved on 28 December 1941. On the front level there were just 489 men, including 88 civilian employees, and on the army level, 222 men, including 29 civilian employees.[5] The total number of personnel for the field headquarters, in comparison with the prewar years, was almost halved. During the following years, the number of workers, and primarily in the leading bodies, substantially increased. The largest number of men (1,488 men, including 217 civilian employees) in certain field headquarters of the fronts was found during that period when TOE No 02/211 of 18 March 1944 was in effect.[6] However, as a result of the further improvement in the structure of the bodies and the increased level of professional skill among the generals and officers, their number in the field headquarters of the field forces had declined by 12 percent by the war's end.

During the first years of the Great Patriotic War there was a rise in the number of bodies and officials directly under the commander of a field force. For example, according to the TOE No 02/201 of 22 March 1942, in addition to the control elements indicated in Table 1, the commander of a front had another four directorates (air force, food supply, intendant and medical), three sections (fuel supply, veterinary and financial) and a staff housekeeping platoon, that is, there were 21 bodies under his control.[7] At the same time, directly subordinate to him were the combined-arms armies and the range of front and attached formations and units. In the aim of relieving the commander of this burden, by the summer of 1944, the number of elements in the field headquarters had been reduced (in a front, for example, to 13). This contributed to the more centralized leadership of the men and equipment in the operations.

The staff of the front (army) was the basic body that was senior in relation to the other directorates, sections and services. The chief of staff, being the commander's first deputy, had the right, on his behalf, to issue orders and instructions to subordinate troops and control bodies. He coordinated the work of all the elements of the field headquarters and organized the activities of the commanders (chiefs) of the branches of troops and special troops (services) in the interests of effective preparation and successful execution of an operation. On the eve of the war, a front staff consisted of eight sections, while that of an army had seven (see Table 2). The course of armed combat showed that the combined-arms staffs could not become an all-encompassing organizational center capable of solving the entire range of questions related to the planning, conduct and complete support of troop combat operations. For this reason, in the summer of 1941, their structure underwent major changes. With the abolishment of the sections for military lines of communications and the organization of the rear, supply and road service, the efforts of the staffs were focused solely on carrying out operational tasks.

The operations section held the leading place on the staff. In accord with the instructions of the commander and the chief of staff, a certain range of persons from this section participated in the planning of operations. It was entrusted with daily supervision over the carrying out of the directives, orders and instructions issued by the commander and the staff of the front (army) on all questions related

Table 2

Changes in TOE Structure of Staffs of Fronts (Armies) during years of Great Patriotic War*

Elements of Organizational Structure**	Number of Personnel			
	Prewar TOE	Sep 1941 TOE	Mar 1942 TOE	Jun 1944 TOE
Command	9 (9)	7 (7)	9 (5)	7 (6)
Operations directorate	—	—	—	69
Operations section	35 (40)	36 (34)	59 (32)	33*** (26)
Auxiliary control post	—	—	— (6)	—
Intelligence section	85 (13)	63 (11)	102 (16)	87 (15)
Fortified regions section	—	9 (-)	22 (-)	—
Section of military and physical training	—	—	—	11 (6)
Topographic section	22 (13)	17 (-)	16 (-)	14 (5)
Organizational, records and manning section	34 (17)	24 (13)	33 (12)	39 (16)
Cipher clerks	29 (-)	73 (12)	78 (14)	33 (16)
Section for the organization of rear services, supply and road service	36 (41)	—	—	—
Section of military lines of communications	41 (21)	—	—	—
Housekeeping section (department)	35 (22)	44 (15)	39 (10)	55 (6)
Financial unit	5 (-)	3 (2)	3 (2)	3 (2)
Commandant's office	2 (1)	1 (1)	1 (1)	4 (1)
Office	—	—	—	11 (5)
General Indicators				
Total bodies, units	11 (9)	10 (8)	10 (9)	11 (11)
Total personnel	333 (177)	277 (95)	362 (98)	333 (104)
Including civilian employees	21 (18)	31 (7)	41 (7)	45 (11)

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*The table has been compiled from materials of the TsAMO, folio 229, inv. 159, file 21, sheets 8-20; folio 209, inv. 1098, file 1, sheets 88-92; folio 213, inv. 2009, file 6, sheets 129-134; folio 233, inv. 2324, file 5, sheets 95-102; folio 382, inv. 8447, file 14, sheets 173-180; folio 357, inv. 5973, file 11, sheets 644-650, 664-670; folio 317, inv. 4334, file 109, sheets 200-210.

**The names of the elements in the organizational structure are given according to the 1944 TOE. The army figures are given in the parentheses.

***The leading section of the operations directorate of a front staff.

to the preparation, conduct and complete support of troop combat operations. The chief of the operations section (he was the first deputy chief of staff) participated in the organization of troop control and the coordination of activities by all the field headquarters bodies in the interests of successfully carrying out the combat tasks.

The operations section usually endeavored to recruit the militarily best trained personnel, since the quality of troop control of the front (army) as a whole depended largely on this. With the change in the nature of combat operations, with the increased technical equipping of the troops and with the increased number of men and equipment in the formations and field forces, the tasks of the section became more diverse, responsible and complicated. As a result there was a continuous rise in the demands placed on the workers. They should be constantly well informed of the situation, be able to analyze it profoundly and thoroughly, anticipate changes and respond promptly to them, combine strict efficiency with creativity, initiative and directness and also achieve maximum teamwork. In a word, the increased role of the operations section in preparing and conducting front-level operations necessitated the development of it into an operations directorate and this was done in the summer of 1944. The newly created directorate included four sections (operations, transport, information and the use of wartime experience), a department of the hydrometeorological service and a general unit.[8] The number of men in it, in comparison with the prewar TOE, doubled.

For organizing clearer troop control, there were groups of sector officers as part of the operations section.[9] They were constantly assigned to the field forces (formations) as well as the separate formations of front-level (army-level) subordination. The chiefs of the sectors, as a rule, had a good knowledge of the state and needs of the troops operating in a given sector, they constantly followed the situation and so forth. This accelerated the preparation of information and calculations for decision taking and the drawing up and sending out of preliminary and combat orders, instructions and directives. This provided effective control and aid to the subordinate troops and staffs and improved their control. The compiling of report documents and the dispatching of them to superior levels were carried out by the officers of the information section (in an army, an information group).

The officers of the other staff sections also carried out responsible tasks. In particular, in the course of the war, the role of the intelligence section increased and it planned, organized and carried out all types of reconnaissance and intelligence in the area of the front (army). With the increased effective and numerical strength of the troops, the activities of the organizational, records and manning section also broadened. All this shows the complexity and the diversity of the work carried out by the combined-arms staffs in the area of troop control. The success of the operations depended largely upon their structure, preparedness and teamwork.

In the course of the war there was a constant rise in the role and responsibility of the chiefs of the branches of troops and special troops (services) for the combat activities of their subordinate men and equipment. On the one hand, this was brought about by the more complicated methods of combat operations, and on the other, by the increased quantity and quality of the weapons available to them. In the interests of the most rational organization of the combat employment of artillery, in the autumn of 1941, the artillery directorates (sections) were reorganized into directorates of the artillery chiefs of the fronts (armies). For increasing their authority and responsibility, the chiefs of the artillery, engineer and armored vehicle and tank troops, by orders of Hq SHC of 25 October, 28 November 1941 and 22 January 1942 were appointed deputy commanders of the fronts (armies).[10] The number of officers was increased in their subordinate directorates (sections) and the corresponding staffs were set up. The appearance of large artillery, mechanized and tank formations and tank armies and their great possibilities for influencing the course of an operation made a new reorganization essential. In November-December 1942, the chiefs of the artillery and armored vehicle and tank troops of the fronts (armies) became, respectively, commanders of the artillery and armored and mechanized troops, while remaining the deputy commanders of the field forces. All of this raised the level of planning and control and made it possible to significantly improve the support for troop combat operations and to provide constant supervision over their activities.

For achieving close cooperation between the frontal aviation and the troops, for its massed use and centralized leadership, in 1942, the air force directorates of the fronts were abolished and the air army directorates were set up on their base.

During the war years very serious attention was given to improving control of the rear units and facilities. For the purposes of a more centralized solving of rear support questions, according to the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense [NKO] of 1 August 1941, the chief of the rear became the deputy commander of the front (army). In 1942, staffs were organized as part of the rear services directorates. The organizational improvement of the rear bodies also was carried out in subsequent years. The structure introduced in the summer of 1944 best conformed to the requirements of the war. The chief of the rear services of a front carried out his activities through the staff of the rear services directorate, five directorates (military lines of communications [railroads], motor vehicle, road, intendant and medical), five independent sections (rear personnel, fuel supply, veterinary, finance, and for personnel records of sergeant and private casualties) and the rear services inspectorate. With the exception of a staff and inspectorate, there were 11 analogous sections under the chief of staff of an army.[11] Such a structure contributed to the centralized control of the rear units and facilities and to the prompt and effective solving of questions involving logistical support for the operations.

The creation of normal conditions for the activity of the front and army control bodies was entrusted to special units and subunits. Thus, the equipment and technical operation of the front communications centers were provided by the front signals regiments, by the individual radio battalions, the signals battalions of the auxiliary control posts and the separate rear signals companies; in the army, this was done by the army signals regiments.[12] Individual motor companies were assigned for the transporting of personnel, equipment and supplies of the control posts. The security units and special formations provided defense, camouflaging and servicing of the field headquarters. For example, the task of guarding the field headquarters of the Western Front was carried out by a security regiment, and on other fronts, by security battalions.

During the war years, the control bodies of the fronts (armies) usually differed from one another. In the first place, in each individual instance this depended upon the importance of the sector, the nature of the tasks, the effective and numerical strength of the field force.[13] Secondly, such bodies as the intelligence sections, the air force directorate, the directorates of the commanders of the tank and mechanized troops and artillery most often were maintained under special TOE. Thirdly, in addition to the designated elements, the staffs (representatives) of the partisan movement, the military counterintelligence and NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] bodies, the newspaper editorial boards and so forth also operated under the field headquarters. For this reason, the number of men at the field headquarters significantly exceeded the number set by the TOE and shown in Table 1. For example, the field headquarters of the Western Front with the service and support units, as of 30 November 1941, numbered 3,223 men and 680 motor vehicles of all types, on 1 February 1942, the figures, respectively, were 3,712 and 611, and on 1 April 1943, 3,109 and 177; on the First Ukrainian Front on 1 September 1944, the figures were 3,689 and 271.[14] Such masses of men and motor transport at the outset of the war were concentrated at one point. The enemy frequently detected them and bombed them and as a result troop control was disrupted. Considering this, Hq SHC demanded changes in the control system, an improvement in the camouflaging of the command posts and a shortening of the time they remained at one place.

As the organizational structure was improved, the front and army control bodies began to be divided into first (the staff, the directorates of the branches of troops and services) and second (rear bodies) echelons. Then, for the purposes of achieving steady and continuous troop control, from the first echelon they began to create command posts [KP], alternative command posts [ZKP], auxiliary posts [VPU] and observation posts [NP] and from the second echelon, rear control posts [TPU].[15] The measures carried out contributed to the stable functioning of the operational level of control bodies under the conditions of active enemy resistance.

Along with the development of the TOE structure for the field headquarters of the fronts and armies, there was also a process of their quantitative growth. While on the first day of the Great Patriotic War three fronts were deployed (Northwestern, Western and Southwestern), and soon thereafter another two (the Northern as of 24 June and the Southern as of 25 June 1941), subsequently their quantity reached 15. At the outset of the war, in the operational fronts there were 14 combined-arms armies while in 1944 their number exceeded 50. The formation of the front and army field forces was dictated by the broadened scope of armed combat, by its increased tension, by the appearance of new tasks and the use of new operations directorates.

As a whole the experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly confirmed that *a continuous improvement in the troop control bodies is a most important pattern in the organizational development of the Armed Forces. Its essence consists in bringing their TOE structure and the preparedness of the working bodies into accord with the demands of combat practice.*

The initial moment of this process during the war was the desire to increase the influence of the control bodies on the subordinate troops and on the course of combat operations and to ensure maximum effectiveness and quality of troop control in an operation and engagement. This was caused primarily by the more complex nature of armed combat, by the sharp increase in the effective and numerical strength of the field forces, by their qualitative growth and by the development of weapons and military equipment.

The trends toward the centralizing of control in practice were reflected in the precise delimitation of the operational and supporting functions of control activities between the corresponding bodies, in the freeing of the combined-arms staffs from performing tasks not inherent to them, by the steady increase in their role in the planning and use of the troops and by the increased efficiency, stability and mobility of the work carried out by all control levels. New bodies were set up which ensured close cooperation between the ground forces and the aviation, they directed the security of the operational rear, and they quickly studied, generalized and made available the wartime experience to the troops. These trends underwent further development in the postwar period. They have not lost their significance either under the conditions of conducting combat operations with the use of nuclear missile weapons.

During the war years, there was a clear tendency for a reduction in the number of bodies and officials directly subordinate to the commanders of the fronts (armies). This made it possible for them to focus their main attention on controlling the combat resources in the operations. In the interests of the best use of the troops in a combat situation, as of 1942 the number of skilled officers was increased in the leading control bodies. This process could be observed up to the summer of 1944. However, by the war's end the picture had changed. A reduction in the number of men in the directorates (sections) became possible due to the acquired experience, to the clear delimitation of functional duties and to the high level of professional training. This experience is very pertinent to today's theory and practice. With the introduction of nuclear weapons, electronics and other military equipment into the troops, the tasks of the control bodies are becoming evermore diverse and complex. A profound study and creative application of the last war's experience can help in successfully carrying them out.

An important particular feature in developing the field headquarters structure in 1941-1945 was that the structure provided for the creation of a flexible system of control posts (KP, ZKP, VPU, NP and TPU) with well-equipped communications centers. In each specific case, this system was organized considering the given situation and the available resources, and because of this firm and continuous troop leadership under any conditions was achieved. This is essential to an even greater degree now as the quality of troop control has assumed decisive significance.

We would particularly like to point out such a trend as the increased role of the commanders and chiefs of the branches of troops and services in planning and using their subordinate resources. They carried out their activities through the appropriate bodies which underwent quantitative and qualitative development. Great attention was given to the leadership of the rear services. With the subordination of all the rear bodies to the chief of the rear of a front (army), there was a sharp improvement in the work of the rear services, their coordination and promptness in the logistical supply of the troops.

It is also essential to emphasize the trend toward an increase in the number of front and army field forces. This is understandable as the increased scope of combat and the creation of new operational-strategic groupings in the course of the war demanded the organization of new field forces.

The importance of the experience of the organizational development of the front and army control bodies during the years of the last war requires a profound study and creative utilization of it in modern theory and practice. This can and should contribute to the further development of the forms and methods of troop control.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "Velikaya pobeda Sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945" [The Great Victory of the Soviet People in 1941-1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 255.

[2] "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirivoy voyne" [Military Art in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voyennoy akademii General'nogo Shtaba, 1973, pp 285, 287.

[3] TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 229, inv. 159, file 21, sheet 8; folio 382, inv. 8447, file 14, sheet 172.

[4] Ibid., folio 208, inv. 2524, file 1, sheets 23, 60, 114; file 6, sheets 6, 7.

[5] The number has been given without considering the personnel of the political directorate (section) and the air force directorate (TsAMO, folio 202, inv. 36, file 22, sheet 49; folio 357, inv. 5973, file 11, sheet 657).

[6] TsAMO, folio 217, inv. 1224, file 6, sheet 85.

[7] Ibid., folio 213, inv. 2009, file 6, sheet 129.

[8] Ibid., folio 233, inv. 2324, file 5, sheets 95, 97-98.

[9] According to the TOE No 02/403 and 02/404 of 1 June 1944, there were 26 sector officers in a front and 11 in an army.

[10] "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Operational Documents of the Great Patriotic War], No 5, Moscow, Izd. Upravleniya izucheniya opyta voyny General'nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, 1947, pp 25, 27, 29.

[11] TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 2324, file 5, sheet 118; folio 317, inv. 4334, file 109, sheet 217.

[12] For more detail on this see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1978, pp 28-38.

[13] Thus, on 22 March 1942, the field headquarters TOE No 02/211 was established for fronts including from 7 to 10 armies; No 02/210 for those with from 4 to 6 armies; No 02/206 for those with from 2 to 3 armies. For certain fronts, considering their specific features, special TOE were introduced. For example, on 17 February 1945, the TOE No 02/503 was approved for the Leningrad Front (TsAMO, folio 217, inv. 1224, file 4).

[14] TsAMO, folio 208, inv. 2579, file 3, sheet 349; file 1A, sheet 285; file 86, sheets 18-19; folio 236, inv. 2676, file 88, sheets 502-504.

[15] For more detail on this see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1978, pp 17-26.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: CONTROL OF ENGINEER TROOPS

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences, Col A. Soskov: "Some Aspects of the Control of Engineer Troops in Operations of the Third Period of the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] During the prewar years, both the Main Military Engineer Directorate of the Soviet Army and the district chiefs of engineer troops were not sufficiently prepared for directing the operational activities of engineer troops in the course of combat operations. They were predominantly concerned with the questions of supplying the troops with engineer weapons, military training and defensive construction. Such a situation during the first months of the war also was found in the fronts and armies. This was exacerbated by the fact that in a number of instances the engineer troops were not used according to their purpose, they suffered unjustified losses and were unable to effectively support the combat operations of the rifle, tank and mechanized troops. The elimination of the designated shortcomings was impossible without a fundamental reorganization of the entire organizational structure of the engineer troop control bodies.

The order of Hq SHC of 28 November 1941 was a crucial step in overcoming the essential shortcomings made in engineer troop control.[1] This document introduced a new organizational structure for the control bodies, in envisaging the proper use of all the engineer forces in the interests of supporting the combat operations of the basic branches of troops.

The chief of the Soviet Army Engineer Troops became a USSR deputy people's commissar of defense. In the fronts and armies the chiefs of the engineer troops were deputy commanders of the fronts (armies). During the first period of the war, engineer troop staffs were set up in the fronts and armies. The engineer troop staff of a front included the following sections: Operations, man-made obstacles, technical and engineer weapons supply. The assistant chief of staff was in charge of engineer reconnaissance. There was an analogous staff structure in the armies only the assistant chiefs of staff performed the corresponding functions instead of sections.

As is seen from the organizational structure of the staffs, the latter had an opportunity to obtain continuous information and to provide flexible and skilled allocation and utilization of the engineer resources.

During the second period of the war, the principles for the combat employment of engineer troops on the offensive and defensive were basically established. In preparing the defenses and during combat operations, the engineer troop staffs of the fronts and armies exercised rigid centralization in engineer troop control, paying particular attention to the maneuvering of man-made obstacles and laying minefields on the basic enemy advance routes. Strictly centralized engineer troop control also occurred in the process of preparing for the offensive operations by the fronts and armies. However, in the course of breaking through the defenses and developing the success of the offensive, the principles for the use of the engineer troops and the methods of their control changed. The basic engineer resources were attached to the combined-arms formations and units. During the second period the brigade organization which was finally established in the engineer troops helped to improve their efficient control.

During the third period of the war, the process was continued of further improving engineer troop control and this depended largely upon the quantitative and qualitative growth of the engineer troops. While in the autumn of 1942, the Soviet army had 35 engineer brigades, and by the start of 1944, some 51, in 1945, their number had almost doubled in comparison with the start of 1944.[2]

In speaking about the TOE structure of the engineer troops which had come into being by the third period of the war, it is essential to point out that from 1944 on, their basic formations were: combat engineer brigades in the combined-arms armies and motorized combat engineer brigades in the tank armies and fronts. There were also special engineer troop units and subunits as well as defensive construction directorates. As a rule, for conducting operations, the armies and fronts were reinforced by engineer formations of the RVGK [Reserve Supreme High Command]. Here the total number of attached engineer troops frequently exceeded the TOE. For example, an analysis of the composition of engineer troop groupings in the Belorussian, Lwow-Sandomierz, Iasi-Kishinev and Vistula-Oder operations indicates that by the start of the offensive the armies had an average of 6-10 engineer battalions (not including the organic), while the fronts had 20-30 (without the organic and the army). Out of the designated number, approximately 60-70 percent of the battalions were directly under the chief of the engineer troops of the army (front). Such a quantity of engineer troops, on the one hand, strongly influenced the achieving of the overall success in the operations, and on the other, required skillful and flexible control.

The immediate work of engineer troop control[3] of the fronts and armies during the preparation and course of an operation was carried out, as a rule, from the combined-arms control posts: from the command post or observation post and sometimes from the auxiliary command post. Thus, in preparing the Iasi-Kishinev Operation in the 37th Army, in addition to the basic command post, three observation posts were set up and one of them was designated the main one. This post, with the start of the operation, became the basic post from which the army commander as well as the chiefs of the branches of troops and services, including the chief of the engineer troops, controlled the subordinate troops during the first stage of the offensive operation.

During this as well as a majority of the other operations from the third period of the war, the chiefs of the engineer troops of the armies and fronts were predominantly with the commanders, having with them a small group of staff officers which provided communication with the engineer troop formations and units, carried out the calculations for organizing the execution of newly arising engineer support problems, issuing the tasks to subordinates and supervising their execution.

The control of the engineer troops during the preparatory period and in the course of offensive operations of the third period of the war consisted in carrying out the following basic measures: the collection and study of data on the engineer situation, planning engineer support for the operation, the prompt issuing of tasks to the troops and officials, leadership of the troops during combat operations and the organization of cooperation between the engineer troops and supported troops. The chiefs and staffs of the engineer troops during the third period of the war, in utilizing the acquired experience in leadership, creatively approached the carrying out of these tasks, they adapted them to the specific conditions and employed a number of procedures which contributed to the effectiveness of engineer troop control.

The collection and study of data on the engineer situation were ordinarily carried out continuously, but this work was particularly intense in preparing for a new operation. For taking a sound decision to organize engineer support, the commander of the army (front), the staff and the chief of the engineer troops had to know the nature of the engineer organization of the enemy positions and defensive lines, the locations and types of man-made obstacles, the condition of roads and bridges, protective and camouflage properties of the terrain, the nature of water obstacles, the availability of local building materials and so forth. These data were collected by studying the existing information on enemy defenses, manuals, descriptions and topographic maps. On the basis of them, the chief of staff of the engineer troops of an army (front) gave specific missions to the engineer reconnaissance subunits and requested aerial photographing of individual regions and lines occupied by the enemy. The conclusions from the assessment of the engineer situation were reported to the chiefs of staff of the armies (fronts) and their intelligence sections and were used in planning engineer support for the forthcoming actions.

Thus, the chief of the engineer troops of the 43d Army under the First Belorussian Front, Col V. M. Vladimirov, in assessing the situation at the end of August 1944, concluded that new information had to be obtained on the presence and nature of the man-made obstacles and defensive works on the state frontier and along the Narew River.[4] The additional data obtained as a result of aerial photographic surveying, the actions of almost 40 engineer reconnaissance groups and the interrogating of prisoners contributed greatly to correctly choosing the breakthrough areas on the enemy defensive lines and to the successful crossing of the Narew River by the troops of the field force.[5]

During the war years, the organizing of the prompt delivery of obtained information to the appropriate staffs was very complex. A large portion of the engineer reconnaissance groups did not have radios and when radios did exist their power did not always make it possible to establish reliable communications.[6] For this reason, the data was usually presented in the form of written reports delivered by couriers (messengers) on various types of transport.

The planning of engineer support for an offensive operation was an important stage in engineer troop control in preparing for this operation. This was based upon the elaboration of an engineer support plan. As a rule, this started ahead of time, approximately 15-30 days before the start of the operation and was concluded after the adopting of a plan by the commander of the front (army). In practical terms the staffs began preparations for the next operation immediately after the preceding one. For this purpose measures were carried out aimed at a detailed study of the terrain and the opposing enemy troop groupings to the entire depth of their operational configuration and the preparation of our own troops in the jump-off areas for them. Often this was done under the pretext of improving the defenses, for example, in the staging areas of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts in the preparation of the offensive from the Vistula to the Oder.[7]

Upon receiving a directive from Hq SHC for an operation or instructions from the commander of the front, the chief and the staff of the engineer troops prepared proposals on organizing engineer support for the forthcoming operation; these usually started from the conclusions drawn from the engineer situation assessment. The proposals gave the capabilities of the enemy engineer troops, the terrain conditions, the state and capability of our own engineer resources to carry out the forthcoming engineer support tasks. Then came calculations on the organizing of these tasks with the setting of their possible scope, dates, place of execution and executors. Particular space was given to calculations for solving such problems as ensuring the breakthrough of enemy defenses, the committing of mobile groups to the engagement and the crossing of water obstacles in the course of the operation. At the end of the document came the effective grouping of engineer troops in the operation and the procedure for allocating the basic types of engineer weapons, particularly engineer ammunition. The proposals were formulated in the form of a briefing statement and, in essence, were the decision of the chief of the engineer troops of the front (army).

After the commander had been briefed on the proposals approved by the chief of staff of the front (army) and on the basis of the supplementary instructions received from the commander, the chief and staff of the engineer troops adjusted the data of the plan, they coordinated them finally with the appropriate chiefs of the branches of troops and special troops, they issued orders for the necessary regrouping of the engineer troops (for the purpose of massing them on the basic sectors of the offensive), they filled them in on carrying out the forthcoming operations and completed the elaboration of the engineer support plan for the operation and other operational documents. It must be pointed out that the adjusted content of the briefing statement was actually the text of the engineer support plan. A topographic map showing all the data given in the briefing statement was an appendix. Thus the time was shortened for working out the documents. In preparing the offensive operations of the third period of the war, additional documents were frequently prepared such as particular plans and diagrams for a more detailed organization to carry out the most important engineer support tasks under the given conditions. Thus, the staff of the engineer troops of the Second Ukrainian Front in the process of preparing the Uman'-Botosani Operation additionally worked out the following: an engineer reconnaissance plan, a plan for building passageways through obstacles, schedules for the crossing of water obstacles and other documents.[9]

As the planning was concluded, the pending tasks were issued to the armies, rifle divisions as well as the engineer troops formations and units. It must be pointed out that in the third period this measure was carried out in a shorter time and various forms and methods were employed to do this. For example, in the preparations for the Vistula-Oder Operation, the engineer troop staffs of the armies of the First Belorussian Front, upon receiving instructions from the front chief of engineer troops, first informed their subordinates of the possible nature of the pending tasks. After conducting reconnaissance and working out the engineer support plans for the operations, the basic provisions of the latter were issued to the corps and division engineers and to the commanders of the engineer formations and units in the form of particular battle orders. For this purpose liaison officers were called in and communications equipment used (particularly on the levels of the front--army--engineer brigade). Sometimes the combat tasks were given personally to the chiefs and commanders.[10]

The solving of questions relating to the coordination of subordinate units and formations both between themselves and with the supported field forces and formations required great efforts on the part of the chiefs of the engineer troops in organizing engineer troop control. This was carried out on the basis of the commander's plan for the forthcoming operation (during the period of its preparation and planning) and was achieved by personal contact of the chiefs and officers of the staffs and the commanders of the engineer troop formations and units with the command and personnel of the staffs and supported troops and by the working out of questions at joint reconnaissance, tactical exercises and military games. For example, in the preparations for the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, the commander of the 37th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front conducted a series of military games on maps and in a sandbox as well as combined-arms exercises to train the staffs and the troops for the forthcoming actions. On the basis of the tasks set by the commander, the chief of the engineer troops, Maj Gen Engr Trps A. I. Goldovich, in the exercises made certain that the commanders of the engineer units and subunits correctly understood the procedure for carrying out the tasks and the method of actions and the able maintaining of cooperation with the supported troops, particularly in breaking through the enemy defenses and in committing a mobile group to the breach.

From an analysis of the experience of the operations conducted in the third period of the war, it follows *that with the start and in the course of an offensive operation, in organizing engineer troop control, the chiefs of the engineer troops and their staffs devoted most attention to the prompt clarification of tasks for the subordinate troops, to maintaining close cooperation between the engineer troops and the supported troops and to controlling the course of carrying out the engineer support tasks,* particularly in breaking through the enemy prepared defenses, in committing the second echelons and mobile groups to an engagement, in pursuing the enemy and crossing water obstacles without a halt.

During the breakthrough of the enemy defenses, the chief of the engineer troops and his staff focused chief attention on directing the actions of those engineer troop formations and units which were making passageways through the enemy mixed minefields and supporting the crossing of the troops over them. The amount of this work was significant. For example, in the Berlin Operation, the engineer troops of the First Belorussian Front, during the night of 16 April 1945, made 340 passageways and removed over 70,000 mines. Up to 35 engineer battalions were used as part of the mine clearing groups and for supporting the passage of the infantry, tanks and artillery across the obstacle zone in the course of the breakthrough.[11] Under such conditions the actions of the battalions were controlled chiefly by the chiefs of the army engineer troops through the troop engineers and the commanders of the attached engineer brigades.

The chief of the front engineer troops was concerned with increasing the effort of the first two (organic and army) echelons of the engineer troops by moving up the front engineer units for broadening the passages and preparing the routes for the subsequent committing of the mobile groups of the front to the breach. Let us demonstrate this from the following example. According to the plan for the Lwow-Sandomierz Operation of the First Ukrainian Front on its third day, in the area of the 60th Army, the 3d Guards Tank Army was to be committed to the engagement. The combat engineers of the 60th Army prepared the routes for this action. However, their efforts were insufficient. The chief of the engineer troops of the front, Lt Gen Engr Trps I. P. Galitskiy, brought in in addition the 15th Assault Combat Engineer Brigade and this ensured the carrying out of the task on time. However, during this period a second task arose. There was the need to cover the right flank of the 60th and 3d Guards Tank armies with mixed minefields. For this the 42d Motorized Combat Engineer Brigade was promptly brought up and its combat engineers laid more than 500 mines, around 100 remote controlled mines and 9 km of electrified obstacles in the sector of the enemy tank counterattack.

Subsequently (on the fourth day of the operation), for exploiting the success, the front commander decided to commit the 1st Guards Tank Army in a previously unplanned sector in the zone of the 13th Army. Under these conditions, the chief of the engineer troops of the front created reconnaissance groups which with the aid of the organic [troop] engineers of the 13th Army, conducted reconnaissance for four routes. Then by the efforts of the traffic support detachments, the roads were repaired on these routes and the bridges reinforced. This ensured the successful committing of the 1st Guards Tank Army to the breach.

With the coming out of the troops into operational space and with the *going over to the pursuit* of the retreating enemy, the conditions for engineer troop control became extremely complex. Their grouping was spread out both along the front and into the depth of the operational configuration. In such a situation various methods of control had to be employed. One of the most effective was personal contact of the chiefs and staff officers of the engineer troops, the troop engineers, commanders of the engineer formations and units with subordinates. For example, the report on engineer support for the Chernigov-Pripyat' Operation and the capturing of bridgeheads on the Dnepr, Pripyat' and Sozh River carried out by the Central Front in August-October 1943 stated: "The leading officer personnel during the entire period of the offensive was in the units, organizing cooperation between the engineer units and the advancing troops.... The staffs of the engineer troops of the armies directed engineer support by directive instructions and personal contact of the officer personnel with the corps and divisional engineers and the commanders of the units and subunits."[12]

The Great Patriotic War showed the advisability also of establishing *operations groups* from the staffs of the engineer troops, particularly for control in those instances when the fronts (armies) were operating in broad areas or advancing at a rapid pace. Sometimes such groups were organized for controlling the engineer units supporting the committing of the tank corps and armies to an engagement for crossing a major water barrier as well as in the engineer troop brigades. In maintaining contact with the chiefs of the engineer troops, the operations engineer groups, in being given the appropriate powers, moved as close as possible to the advancing rifle and subordinate engineer troops and this provided an opportunity on the spot to adopt the proper measures which would ensure the successful carrying out of the combat tasks by them. The composition of the engineer operations groups varied. Thus, in the Vistula-Oder Operation of the First Belorussian Front two groups were set up (one at the center of the area and the other on the left wing)[13] with the following composition. The first group which was at the front's VPU [auxiliary command post], consisted of four senior staff officers from the engineer troops, two officers from the reserve of the front chief of the engineer troops, liaison officers from the engineer troop formations and messengers. The group was headed by the chief of the operations section of the engineer troop staff of the front, Col K. S. Kostenko. The second group which was at one of the command posts of the armies on the left wing of the front was headed by the senior assistant chief of the operations section of the front engineer troop staff. Constant communications were maintained between both groups as well as with the front engineer troop staff (the basic personnel of which headed by the chief of staff was located at the front's command post). In the course of the combat operations, the officers of the operations groups traveled out to the armies (divisions) and engineer troop brigades for clarifying the course of carrying out the tasks and situation and for providing aid. The persons in charge of the groups reported the results of this work to the chief and the staff of the front's engineer troops.

For controlling engineer troops in the crossing of major rivers, the chiefs of the fronts' engineer troops who were usually assigned as the chiefs of the front crossings, set up a crossing staff headed by the chief of the operations section of the front's engineer troop staff.[14] The engineer troops were controlled analogously in the crossing of water obstacles on the army level.

The crossing staffs of the fronts (armies) had telephone communications not only directly with the immediately subordinate crossings but also with the chiefs of the crossing sectors who were the combined-arms commanders.

The success in the organizing of engineer support for a crossing to a significant degree was determined by the effective control of the engineer troop grouping assigned for setting up and maintaining the crossings. Here the chief thing was the leadership of the regrouping and the moving up of the engineer troops with the crossing equipment to the water barrier, the maintaining of the crossings in working order and the maneuvering of the crossing equipment.

In briefly summarizing, it is essential to point out that the organization and methods of engineer troop control were continuously improved and reached the greatest development in the operations of the third period of the Great Patriotic War.

Such trends were clearly apparent such as reducing the time for planning engineer support and for issuing tasks to the troops, the bringing closer of leadership over the engineer troop actions by the senior engineer chiefs by setting up temporary operations groups, and the skillful concentration of the basic efforts of the engineer troop groupings on carrying out primarily the tasks which directly influenced the successful actions of the troops of the fronts and armies in the operations.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "Sbornik royevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Operational Documents of the Great Patriotic War], No 5, Moscow, 1947, pp 26-27.

[2] "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestevnnoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], Vol 5, Voyenizdat, 1963, p 42; "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodinu" [Engineer Troops in the Battles for the Soviet Motherland], Voyenizdat, 1970, p 372.

[3] In the article chief attention is given to the control of the engineer troops and not the entire system of engineer support of combat operations which would include a broader range of questions relating to the activities of the chiefs of the engineer troops.

[4] TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 403, inv. 90386, file 1, sheets 44-46.

[5] Ibid., folio 510, inv. 288464, file 5, sheet 53.

[6] Ibid., folio 240, inv. 924022, file 3, sheets 255-260.

[7] Ibid., folio 233, inv. 265436, file 3, sheets 112-140.

[No footnote No 8 in original text]

[9] Ibid., folio 240, inv. 35393, file 1, sheets 1-10, 50-71.

[10] Ibid., folio 233, inv. 265436, file 3, sheets 129-130.

[11] "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh...," pp 314, 315.

[12] TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 217563, file 1, sheets 65-68.

[13] Ibid., inv. 26436, file 3, sheet 273.

[14] "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh...," p 389.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Docent and Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col Yu. Perechnev: "Cooperation of Artillery with Amphibious Landing Forces"]

[Text] During the war, over 110 operational and tactical landings were made, not counting the small sabotage and reconnaissance ones. Landed in the enemy flanks and rear, they contributed to the tenacity of the ground forces on the defensive and to their rapid advance on the offensive. Their results had an indirect and direct influence on the situation not only immediately on the maritime sectors of the fronts but also in the wider coastal areas. The success of the landing parties was achieved due to many factors, including cooperation with the artillery.

During the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the fleets and flotillas landed 40 amphibious parties. Some 57,000 men participated in them.[1] Even during the first week of the war, two landing forces which captured a beachhead over 70 km long were landed on the enemy coast by the Danube Flotilla. The ground forces artillery also participated in the artillery softening up of the landing and in the support of the landing forces along with the flotilla ships.

In the landing in the area of Grigor'yevka (near Odessa) on 22 September 1941 by the 3d Naval Infantry Regiment (1,929 men), the artillery softening up was carried out by 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers and in addition to these ships, artillery support was provided by a gunboat and 10 launches.

The landing made by the Northern Fleet in 1941 in the region of Zapadnaya Litsa (529 men on 6 July, 500 on 7 July and 1,600 men on 14 July) was supported by fire of a destroyer, escort vessels, minesweepers, patrol boats and coastal artillery.

In July 1941, patrol boats and coastal artillery were involved in artillery support for the landing parties of the Baltic Fleet on the islands in the Hanko area.

Let us take up in greater detail the cooperation of the artillery with the landing forces in the *Kerch'-Feodosiya Landing Operation* (26 December 1941-2 January 1942) the landing forces of which included around 42,000 men. Let us immediately point out that the fire support for the landing on the northern coast of the Kerch'

Peninsula was poor (just 3 gunboats). The landing on the eastern coast was supported by batteries of shore and field artillery located on the Taman' Peninsula. The strongest was the artillery support for the landing at Feodosiya. The naval support detachment (OKP, consisting of 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers) was given the following mission: during the battle of the landing to provide strong artillery support and cover for the landing forces, in neutralizing the enemy emplacements, and then provide fire support for the landed units.

From 0345 hours on 29 December, 132 medium-caliber shells and 320 45-mm shells were fired at the port area and the city of Feodosiya. During the landing of the first wave, in 22 minutes the cruisers "Krasnyy Kavkaz" and "Krasnyy Krym" and the destroyer "Zheleznyakov" fired 500 medium-caliber rounds and 522 45-mm rounds. After this the ships came into the roadsteads and fired underway, expending 1,127 shells of 180-76-mm caliber and 1,122 45-mm caliber shells. Firing was chiefly against visible targets and by areas. It is essential first of all to note that a heavy artillery softening up, as had been the attention of the mission, did not succeed. Those 132 medium-caliber shells and 320 small-caliber shells were clearly insufficient to neutralize the enemy gun emplacements and demoralize it. The enemy put up strong resistance to the landing force. Regardless of this, the Kerch'-Feodosiya Landing Operation ended with the capture of an operational beachhead in the Crimea from which later the troops of the Crimean Front were deployed. The Kerch' enemy grouping suffered a defeat. The possibility of an enemy invasion of the Caucasus across the Taman' Peninsula was prevented. The enemy reduced its forces advancing against Sevastopol', shifting a portion of them to counter our landing forces.

The experience of the listed and other amphibious landings from the first period of the war makes it possible to disclose a number of shortcomings in the organization and the maintaining of their cooperation with the artillery. This was primarily the low effectiveness of the artillery fire. This was caused not only by the insufficient quantity of allocated artillery but also by the fact that the artillery used area fire, without correction.

The results of the artillery softening up were not always utilized due to the large time gap between its ending and the start of the landing. The reason for this was that the artillery softening up started at the time stipulated by the landing plan but the landing forces for various reasons were late in reaching the designated points. A significant gap (30 minutes and more) between the end of the softening up of the beachhead and the actual start of the landing was noted in the areas of Grigor'yevka and Sudak. As a result the landing party was deprived of the possibility of a surprise landing.

During the first period of the war *the importance of creating artillery correcting posts* became apparent as these provided the artillery with target designations for firing and they maintained contact with the landing units operating on the shore. Thus, in the landing of the party in the area of Cape Pikshuyev (27 April-13 May 1942), the artillery support for the actions of the landing troops was entrusted to a naval support detachment (a destroyer, 2 escort vessels and 9 patrol boats) and two shore batteries (one with 122-mm-caliber guns and the other with 130-mm caliber).[2] The ships fired at anchor, that is, from previously established and correspondingly designated positions. The ships maintained contact with the correcting posts, while the shore batteries did not have direct contact with the landing forces and their fire, as a rule, was carried out not from the requests and target designations of the landing force but rather against independently selected targets. Regardless of the fact that the shore batteries spent 2,358 shells (2-fold more than the ships), their fire did not provide substantial aid to the landing forces.

The acquired experience in the coordination of the artillery with the landing troops was reflected in the 1943 Red Army Field Manual. "During the period from the start of the landing," it stated, "until its artillery goes into operation, the fleet provides the troops the fullest and strongest support:

"By neutralizing enemy weapons and personnel in the coastal area by ship firing;

"By neutralizing enemy artillery firing from the interior...." It was pointed out that "the staffs jointly with the operational troop and naval formations establish dependable contact between themselves and exchange liaison officers. The liaison officers should have a good knowledge of the situation on shore and at sea and of the actions of their formations (units)."[3]

A particular feature of landing forces in the second period of the war was the fact that the landings were made under conditions of stronger enemy resistance in comparison with 1941-1942. The Nazi command began to pay more attention to antilanding defense (PDO) in assigning tanks, artillery, mobile reserves, ships and aviation to this and in using various obstacles in the water and on the shore. Thus, the PDO for the eastern part of the Kerch' Peninsula at the end of 1943 was provided by the forces of up to 5 divisions reinforced by two batteries with 210-mm caliber guns, 30 150-mm caliber guns, 9 105-mm caliber guns, 4 75-mm caliber guns as well as 11 mortar and 23 antiaircraft batteries. The enemy PDO was echeloned. At sea up to 30 high-speed landing barges, 37 torpedo boats, 25 patrol boats and 6 minesweepers were involved in it.

Quite naturally the strengthening of the enemy PDO required the taking of the corresponding measures to surmount this, including using a larger amount of artillery for the artillery softening up of the capturing of beachheads and the support of landing operations on the coast. In addition, artillery, mortars, tank and antitank units began to be part of the landing troops.

An important particular feature was that the coastal and field artillery began to be widely used for fire support, in addition to the naval artillery. This was explained by the fact that in 1943, the landings were carried out close to the positions of our troops. Thus, for supporting the landing in the area of Yuzhnaya Ozereyka--Stanichka (February), 29 coastal artillery guns were assigned,[4] 209 guns (161 from the 18th Army and 48 from the Novorossiysk Naval Base) for the landing in the port of Novorossiysk (September),[5] and 564 field artillery guns and 55 naval artillery guns for the landing in the area of Kerch' (November).[6]

The use of the ship, shore and field artillery to support the landing forces significantly strengthened the fire effect against the enemy PDO and made it possible to create an artillery density of 20-50 guns per kilometer of landing front. Thus, in the Novorossiysk Landing Operation, this was 20-40 guns (without the rocket artillery), 55 guns in the landing area of the 56th Army and 18 guns in the landing area of the 18th Army during the Kerch'-El'tigen Operation.

The more *careful preparation for the landing operations* was one of the ways to improve cooperation between artillery and amphibious landing forces in the second period of the war. Thus, 10 days before the start of the operation in the area of Yuzhnaya Ozereyka--Stanichka, the commanders of the cruiser gunnery departments were acquainted with the task of utilizing the ship artillery and the corresponding documents. The squadron commander, Vice Adm L. A. Vladimirskiy, held a muster for the commanders of the ships, navigation and gunnery departments where they analyzed the methods of firing at the shore and checked the ability of the department commanders to make the navigation and artillery calculations under conditions analogous to the conditions of the pending operation (without disclosing its place and time). Under the leadership of the squadron chief of staff, Capt 1st Rank V. A. Andreyev, two combat exercises were conducted for the cruisers with all participants at their battle stations as was planned during the operation. The squadron's flagship gunnery officer conducted two conferences with the commanders of the gunnery departments at which he gave them instructions on combat training in accord with the tasks to be carried out in the operation and acquainted them with the documents. Of the documents worked out by the squadron staff, the most essential were: "Gunnery Planning Table," "Plan for Firing on Targets" and "Instructions for Using Artillery of the Ships of the Fire Support Detachment." A day before the operation the staff transmitted these to the ships.

For training the signals officers and pilots in fire correction, an actual firing was carried out by the destroyer "Besposhchadnyy" from the Batumi roadsteads against the shoreline in the region of the Chorokh River. Two MBR-2 aircraft participated in the spotting.

Great attention was given to training the correcting posts who were to land with the first waves of landing troops. Each post included a commander (artillery officer), his deputy (petty officer) and three radio operators. Training for them was carried out under conditions as close as possible to actual combat and was aimed basically at establishing contact with the ships. As a result of numerous training drills and exercises, the correcting posts reached a mutual understanding with the ships and established clear and dependable communications.

The preparation of the artillery at the Novorossiysk Defensive Area and the Novorossiysk Naval Base consisted in careful reconnaissance of the enemy gun emplacements, topographical surveying for the location of the artillery battle formations and carrying out preliminary ranging for the command posts and observations posts. Roaming batteries and artillery reconnaissance and observation (AIR) equipment were widely used to discover Nazi gun emplacements. In changing positions, our batteries shelled the enemy for the purpose of causing response fire. From the shell bursts and the sound, the AIR got a fix on the enemy gun emplacements. These preparations made it possible to achieve the most effective help for the landing party when it landed at Stanichka. Having preranged targets, our artillery carried out artillery softening up of the landing area along a front of 2 km. The neutralization of the gun emplacements located directly by the water lasted 10 minutes. During this time the artillery troops fired over 1,500 shells of 76-152-mm caliber.

Preparations of the artillery for the landing force in Novorossiysk in September 1943 were carried out even more carefully. Here the artillery was given, in particular, the following tasks: by destroying the enemy engineer defensive works, weapons and personnel to ensure the unobstructed landing of the forces and then, in conducting planned fire and requested fire from the landing units, to support their successful operations on the coast. Characteristically, for the convenience of control and for the organizing and maintaining of cooperation, all artillery involved in the support of the landing force was divided into three groups.

During the 20-day preparatory period, a plan was worked out for the artillery preparations for the landing, and certain batteries were moved to positions from which they could successfully support the landing force. Along with the permanent correction posts which had existed previously on the forward edge, another seven were set up with the mission of landing with the first wave of landing troops. A new feature in this operation was that the commanders of the artillery groups personally discussed with the landing unit commanders the questions of support for the landing troops fighting on the coast and also agreed upon the locations of the correcting posts and the communications procedures with them both for the artillery troops and landing forces.

On 10 September, at 0244 hours, when the landing forces were approaching the tactical deployment line and were preparing to break into the port, upon the signal of the landing commander, Rear Adm G. N. Kholostyakov, all the artillery and mortar units, in accord with the plan table and plan, opened up drum fire against the enemy. At 0259 hours, precisely according to plan, the fire was shifted to a depth of 500-600 m away from the shore.[7] At 0317 hours, the artillery shifted to counter-battery firing and the destruction of the enemy gun emplacements. As a total during the period of the landing battle, the artillery fired over 8,350 rounds of from 76 to 203-mm caliber and this was an average of 470 rounds per 0.1 km^2 on the first line and around 250 for the second. In addition, during this time over 3,360 rockets and 2,440 mortar shells were fired.

We should point out that in the given operation, consideration was given to the experience of the first period of the war. Let me give the following example. In landing the party in the area of Grigor'yevka (near Odessa), the artillery softening up was carried out by the ships from a distance of 15-20 cable lengths during a dark, moonless night. The low visibility conditions forced them to use illuminating shells. But their firing had to be halted as they gave away not only the landing craft moving toward the shore but also the firing ships. The question was settled differently in the Novorossiysk Operation. When our batteries opened fire upon the signal of the landing force commander, one gun fired illuminating shells which burst in the area of the settlement of Mefodiyevskiy. The height of the bursts was so calculated as to fully utilize the illuminating time but not to illuminate the ships approaching the port with the landing force. In this case the use of illuminating shells proved fully effective and made it possible not only to carry out vertical laying against the shoreline which was illuminated by the shells but also to measure distance with the range-finders and correct fire by observing the signs of a hit.

The heavy artillery and mortar softening up of the landing areas and the continuous support for the landing forces during the period of their actions on the shore were one of the important components in the success of this landing operation which helped to liberate Novorossiysk. Here we succeeded in demoralizing the enemy, in disrupting its defensive system and to carry out the landing without significant casualties.

The well-organized cooperation of the landing detachments with the artillery ensured the landing of the party immediately after the cease-fire against the shoreline and the shifting of it into the depth of the defenses. As a consequence of this the enemy was unable to impose order on its disrupted defensive system on the forward edge while its weapons and personnel in depth at the moment of the landing were under intensive fire by our artillery.

Thus, the improvement in coordination between artillery and amphibious landings in the second period of the war was carried out by increasing the density of fire through involving the artillery of the ships, the coastal defenses and the ground troops in the artillery softening up and in the support, by careful elaboration of the documents and early preparation of the men and equipment, by increasing the number of fire correction posts, by establishing closer contacts between the commanders of the artillery and landing subunits, by creating gunnery groups and so forth.

During the third period of the war these trends were further developed as is confirmed by the Tuloksa (June 1944), Moonsund (autumn 1944) landing operations, the landings of the Northern Fleet during the period of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation (October 1944) and others. Also worthy of attention and study is the experience of cooperation between the artillery and landing forces of the Pacific Fleet during the war against imperialist Japan. In organizing cooperation, the commanders and the staffs endeavored to coordinate combat efforts in terms of time, place and objectives.

In organizing cooperation among the forces in landing operations, the basic document was the plan table which was compiled by the staff of the operation's commander with the participation of the staffs of the formations of the landing troops, the ships and artillery. On the basis of the plan of the landing operation commander, the staffs of the gunnery support detachment and the shore and field artillery groups worked out: an order for artillery support, calculations of the courses and the time for moving into the landing area (for the ships), the fire plan table for neutralizing the PDO and supporting the landing force when it carried out its mission on shore.

The planning of artillery fire proved effective also in the battle for the landing and in supporting the subsequent actions of the landing force.

As a rule, the landing of a force was preceded by serious *special training of the men and equipment*. Here main attention was given to the actual working out of communications and cooperation both within the landing force as well as between the landing force and the artillery supporting it. During the preparatory period the ships worked on firing at the shore underway and together with the shore artillery, the methods of counterbattery firing. They carried out registration fire and ranging for targets and trained the personnel of the fire correcting posts. Particular attention was given to reconnaissance. The integrated use of the various types and means of reconnaissance and the analysis and comparison of the data obtained by it provided an opportunity to determine with sufficient accuracy the position of the enemy engineer works and to disclose the system of enemy defensive fire to its entire depth. Determining the precise coordinates of the targets ensured highly efficient fire. Of particular significance was the obtaining of dependable data on the firing positions of the shore, field and mortar batteries and the calibers of their guns, on the fire plan and on the defensive works. Often reconnaissance groups were dropped in the rear of the enemy defenses.

In 1944-1945, there was further development of the *trend for personal contact between the commanders of the artillery and landing units,* and the exchange of liaison officers. The landing operations of the Northern Fleet in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation were an example of this. During the course of it, the 63d Naval Infantry Brigade under the command of Col A. M. Krylov was ordered during the night of 10 October to land on the southern shore of M. Volokovaya Bay in order to assist the advance of the troops of the 14th Army. The 12th Naval Infantry Brigade (commander, Col V. V. Rassokhin) was given the mission of breaking through the enemy defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula. The actions of these two brigades were to be constantly supported by the 113th Separate Shore Artillery Battalion (four 152-mm guns, eight 130-mm and three 100-mm) and the 104th Cannon Artillery Regiment (16 152-mm guns, 4 107-mm and 8 122-mm).[8] In addition, the naval infantry brigades had their own artillery and mortar subunits and counting these there were 203 guns and mortars. The 104th Cannon Regiment, the 113th Battalion and the artillery of the naval infantry brigades were directly under the commander of the Northern Defensive Area (SOR). Thus, control over all the artillery was concentrated in one person.

The landing also planned for a feint landing in the area of Cape Pikshuyev. The actions of this detachment were to be supported by the artillery of the destroyers "Gromkiy" and "Gremyashchiy." In the preparatory period, great attention was given to working out coordination between the naval infantry units and the artillery supporting them. Joint exercises and drills were conducted for the officer personnel. In the exercises the landing officers became acquainted with the capabilities of the naval artillery, while the artillery troops not only learned their task but also the maneuvers of that landing subunit with which they were to cooperate. On 8 October, in the terrain the general markers were established and a unified target numeration was established. The officers from the landing troops indicated the lines for the advance and the attack, the directions of the attacks while the artillery commanders demonstrated the registration lines and the terrain areas. Here also they agreed upon the procedure for calling in and shifting fire and the signals table was clarified. For speed in calling in fire, the officers of the landing troops were issued photodiagrams with the registered areas and lines marked on them.

For providing fire correction 14 corrections posts were sent to the brigades from the 113th Separate Shore Artillery Battalion and the 104th PAP [Cannon Artillery Regiment]. For ensuring cooperation between the artillery and supporting ships, a squadron flagship gunnery officer was at the command post of the artillery staff. One of the ship correction posts was assigned to the sound ranging platoon of the artillery reconnaissance battalion.

Due to the clear organization of cooperation, there was every opportunity to make coordinated blows against the enemy at the stipulated times and in the area most dangerous to the enemy.

During the landing of the forces and during the breakthrough of the defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula, the SOR artillery neutralized the enemy shore batteries and searchlights and then provided fire support to the naval infantry units. Each artillery group carried out its missions. Thus, the shore artillery group fired against the shore batteries and searchlights. The artillery subunits of the naval infantry neutralized and destroyed the gun emplacements, they cut passageways through the wire obstacles and combated the mortar batteries. The enemy field-type gun emplacements were attacked by a weapons group of predominantly small caliber. The neutralization and blinding of observation posts were carried out by specially assigned artillery and mortar batteries which fired smoke and fragmentation shells. In the course of supporting the landing of the forces and in breaking through the enemy defenses on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula, the SOR artillery expended 47,000 shells. The well-organized cooperation between the naval infantry units and the artillery contributed to the successful carrying out of the tasks in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation.

During the third period of the war direct *artillery support for beachheads started*, as a rule, 30-50 minutes before the landing of the forward detachments and lasted 20-40 minutes. The first strikes were made against the forward defensive edge which was located along the water's edge. When the first wave of landing craft was approaching the shore, the artillery shifted its fire in depth for neutralizing the tactical reserves. It then shifted to support for the landing force and countered enemy artillery. In individual instances the duration of the artillery softening up lasted up to 75 minutes. In the landing of the forces on the islands of Vyborg Bay (July 1944), the plan envisaged a 5-minute intense shelling against the artillery and mortar batteries, the PDO gun emplacements on Teikarsaari and Suonionsaari islands and then 60 minutes of steady fire for the purpose of neutralizing and destroying the PDO. Directly before the approach of the landing forces to the landing areas, there would be another 5 minute artillery firing with the subsequent shifting of it in depth.

If the actions of the landing force on shore required artillery support without fail, this was not always the case during the initial period of the landing. Sometimes in the interests of surprise artillery softening up was not carried out (the landing at the port of Liinahamari in October 1944). This proved fully effective, since the enemy was caught by surprise. Artillery support in analogous instances began the moment that the enemy put up resistance to the landing troops.

Continuous and flexible *cooperation of artillery was ensured* by the landing in 1944-1945 of a sufficient number of correction posts in the first wave or in the first stage of the landing. During the Kuril Landing Operation (August 1945), the Pacific Fleet sailors, in considering the experience of the landings of our western fleets, organized the correction posts in terms of the number of ships and artillery support batteries and, in addition, had two reserve ones for the instance of the loss or knocking out of certain posts. Experience showed that in being part of the battle formations of the landing troops, they could give the most complete information on the course of the battle in the landing area and at any moment were able to call in artillery fire and direct it at the targets the destruction of which was particularly important at the given time. As a rule, in the course of an offensive by the landing troops, the situation changed very quickly and often an extreme need arose to call in or shift artillery fire. The presence of correction posts under the landing troop commanders made it possible to reaim the artillery at the needed moment for carrying out the most important tasks.

Thus, clearly organized cooperation of the landing troops and the artillery during the years of the Great Patriotic War was one of the most important conditions for the success of an amphibious landing. Such questions as the careful working out of the documents, the preparation of the resources, the expensive use of ships in artillery support, the establishing of closer contacts between the commanders of the artillery and landing units, the improvement of fire correcting and others have not lost their significance at present.

FOOTNOTES

[1] TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 6, file 11242, file 33324.

[2] In the course of combat operations three other destroyers were used for artillery support.

[3] "Polevoy ustav Krasnoy Armii (proyekt)" [Red Army Field Manual (Draft)], Moscow, Voyennoye izdatel'stvo Narodnogo komissariata oborony, 1943, pp 385, 386.

[4] TsVMA, folio 18, file 32787, sheet 6.

[5] Ibid., folio 55, file 7174, sheet 28.

[6] Ibid., sheet 8.

[7] Ibid., sheet 46.

[8] Ibid., folio 767, inv. 15911, file 10, sheet 47.

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SOVIET NAVY VISIT TO INDIA DESCRIBED

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[Article published under the heading "Memoirs" by Capt 1st Rank P. Ablamonov: "A Visit of Ships to Friendly India"]

[Text] During the days of December 1980, when it was below zero in Moscow, the capital of India, decked out in flowers and festooned with flags joyously welcomed the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev. It seemed that the multimillion population of Delhi had poured out onto the streets and squares. The TV viewers of both countries watched a live report on the movement of the cavalcade along the heavily populated route running from the airport of the Indian capital to the Presidential Palace. The solemn ceremony of greeting and the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which reigned during the talks between L. I. Brezhnev and the Indian Prime Minister I. Gandhi and the other Indian leaders as well as the important documents signed during the visit confirmed the high level of relations between the two countries. Held in a situation of sincerity and mutual understanding, this visit has become an important historical marker along the path of further strengthening friendship between the USSR and India. The firm basis for this is the Soviet-Indian Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, as was stated in the document of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Results of the Visit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, to India."[1] The visit added a new content to the traditional friendly relations between the USSR and India and was a weighty contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

As was rightly pointed out by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at a meeting in Delhi, "in developing relations of friendship between the USSR and India at present, we are doing a good thing and not only for the present generation of our peoples but also for coming generations, for the peaceful future of mankind."[2]

The tree of Soviet-Indian friendship is growing new branches and the relations between our states are being enriched by new ties and exchanges. Visits by naval ships are also a manifestation of the growing ties between the two countries. During the last 12 years alone, the ships of the Soviet Navy have made many official and business calls to India. I well recall the first visit. This was 13 years ago. At that time, reciprocal visits by the ships of both countries had just started and that first visit laid the foundations for close ties between the Soviet and Indian navies.

At that time a long cruise by a detachment of ships from the Red Banner Pacific Fleet consisting of the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy," the missile ships "Gordyy" and the large subchaser "Steregushchiy" headed by the fleet commander, Adm N. N. Amel'ko, was a significant event in the life of the fleet. The Soviet sailors had the honor of visiting friendly India for the first time during the 50-year history of the Soviet state. That cruise was in response to a visit by the Indian Navy cruiser "Mysore" to Odessa in 1964. The Pacific Fleet sailors had to navigate under difficult tropical conditions. The detachment included ships of various designs and purposes and built in various years. There was both the fleet veteran, the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" and the very new large subchaser "Steregushchiy."

The intense preparatory period was over and the day of farewells had come. In the spring morning of 14 March 1968, the piers of the Vladivostok Bay Zolotoy Rog [Golden Horn] were filled with escorting vessels. Here were the secretaries of the Primorskiy Party Kraykom, the leading workers of the kray executive committee and the representatives of the workers. It was the incomparable ritual of saying farewell to the ships. The sailors stood frozen in formation on the decks. The melodies of solemn marches resounded over the pier.

Finally the moorings were cast off and one after another the ships left the Zolotoy Rog Bay. The flag of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Adm N. N. Amel'ko, was hoisted on the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy."

At sea the life of the personnel assumed its cruise pace. Upon the "Grand Muster" signal, the sailors, petty officers and officers of the cruiser formed up on the poop, forming a wide circle. Linked by invisible radio waves, the personnel of the three ships participated in a major meeting relayed from the cruiser. The Soviet sailors had one mission, to worthily carry the motherland's flag abroad and to honorably carry out the assignment of the party and people.

This cruise was rich in numerous memorable events. When the ships passed through the Straits of Korea, a solemn ceremony was held to honor the Russian sailors who had fought courageously and died in the Straits of Tsushima. The cruiser's commander, Capt 2d Rank N. Ya. Yasakov (now Vice Admiral) gave a brief, stirring speech to those assembled. He spoke of the wholehearted bravery of the Russian people and recreated a picture of the past engagement. The Navy Flag was lowered in honor of the dead. The sailors, petty officers and officers knelt down and removed their hats. At that time a group of sailors went to the edge of the poop and slowly lowered green wreaths into the water. On them was the inscription: "Eternal glory to the hero sailors of the Russian Navy." Over the poop floated the song "Far Off in the Tsushima Straits." The entire assembly picked it up.

During the cruise training did not halt for a minute. Upon alerts the sailors worked on their actions at their battle stations, they learned damage control and to hit targets at the distant ranges.

While on the long cruise, the sailors did not feel themselves cut off from the homeland. They were constantly kept informed of events happening in the nation and abroad. Tape recorded information was broadcast over the ship radio. Each day the "News of the Day" was delivered to the battle stations and this was printed at the ship print shop. Political exercises were held in all groups on the subject "Value the Honor and Dignity of the Soviet Sailor Abroad." These were conducted by Hero of the Soviet Union, Rear Adm I. A. Sornev, Rear Adms V. D. Pil'shchikov and A. S. Babushkin and other leaders of the detachment.

Party political work was carried out in a militant manner. From the very first miles of the cruise, the communists explained to the sailors the aim of the visit and the specific obligations of each man. The party members, in speaking in front of a map of the world, acquainted the personnel with the socioeconomic system and customs of the people of India and other countries which would be passed by our ships. Each day the ship radio broadcast materials on the men who had distinguished themselves in the socialist competition and in standing the running watches.

The socialist competition between the sailors, squads and teams developed widely. The sailors struggled to reduce the norms, to save fuel and lubricants and to stand watches only with an evaluation of excellent. This reached the greatest intensity in the engineering departments where there was a competition between the running shifts. The graphs for the standing of watches and the daily summing up of results ensured publicizing of the competition and the comparison of its results. From the very first day of the cruise, first place was held by the damage control group under the command of Engr-Capt-Lt V. Ovchinnikov.

On 28 March the ships arrived at the port of Madras. There was the ritual of entering the port. A band was formed up on the cruiser's deck. A line of sailors all in white stretched along the sides. Over the roadsteads, shattering the air, rumbled a 21-gun salute, the salute of a nation. The national anthems of India and the Soviet Union were played. The Indian cruiser "Delhi" which had arrived specially in Madras to welcome the Soviet ships fired a response salute.

Our ships were assigned the best berth. As soon as the mooring lines were in place, columns of workers with waving red flags and enormous signs marched along the pier. They waved their hands, in loudly and happily greeting the visitors of the Soviet Union. Our sailors responded in the same way.

The gangway was scarcely down when a group of leaders from the longshoremen's union came onboard the cruiser. Dressed in their white national clothing, they went up to Adm N. N. Amel'ko and put a wreath of flowers on his neck.

The news that Madras was being visited by Soviet sailors quickly spread through the 2 million population of the city. Thousands of Madras inhabitants rushed to the port to visit our ships. The flood of people was so great that the roads leading to the port became blocked. Motor traffic came to a halt. As they say, young and old hurried to the ships. Our sailors were attentive and polite. They helped the elderly, the women and children up the gangways, they showed the ships to the visitors and and talked about their service and the Soviet way of life. The office worker Murti who visited the cruiser with his entire family told the guide, Capt 3d Rank N. I. Belkin: "For my entire life I will keep the indelible impression of our visit to your ship. Your country has miraculous ships and remarkable people. We will remember your visit for a long time."

In a short period of time our sailors, petty officers and officers had acquired many friends in Madras. The following case comes to mind. On the deck of the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" the Soviet sailor Igor' Fedotov met the Indian port worker Uman. They exchanged greetings: the former saluted properly and the latter in the Indian custom touched the palms of his hands together in front of his face.

Having introduced themselves, both turned to the stand. The Indian guest, in looking at the photographs telling about the labor, recreation and education of the Soviet people, several times pronounced the word "good." Suddenly the worker saw on the sailor's blouse a Komsomol insignia with the image of V. I. Lenin. He pointed to it and smiling, said:

"Lenin."

The sailor nodded his head affirmatively. He was pleased that in this distant Indian port a simple worker knew well the dear name and an awareness of this filled his heart with pride. Somehow instinctively the sailor realized that the dock worker wanted very much to obtain such an insignia as a momento and took out of his pocket another, also with the image of Lenin, and handed it to the worker. The worker initially was confused, but then with great pride accepted the gift. As if lost in conjecture, he swept his hand across the stand and then pointed to Lenin. Both understood each other: all that had been achieved by the Soviet people was due to the genius of Lenin and his all-conquering teachings. The Soviet sailor and the Indian dock worker shook each other's hands, feeling that they had somehow drawn closer together and realizing that they were united by the dear name of Lenin. They did not part until the end of the tour. Fedotov showed the worker the ship and in conclusion presented a book to him on the Soviet Union with a portrait of V. I. Lenin on the cover. This pleased the guest most of all and he did not know how to thank his new friend. When he was getting ready to leave the cruiser, he handed the sailor his own insignia on which was depicted the crossed Indian and Soviet flags.

The Soviet sailors in turn were very interested in learning about Madras. They were confronted with the life of the city with all its contradictions inherited from the many centuries of the rule of colonialists. The sailors had a look at the everyday life of its inhabitants, full of contrast.

In the Madras national museum, we saw many exhibits showing the inexhaustable wealth of India. It has virtually all the known minerals. The flora and fauna of the nation are some of the most diverse in the world. India could feed a larger population than it now has, but, regardless of this, is experiencing significant economic difficulties inherited from colonialism. All of this has impeded its development. But the independent Indian people, in overcoming the consequences of the past, are confidently building a new life.

A monument to labor is being erected on the wide quay of Madras. On a pedestal is a figure of a worker with an upraised hammer in his hands. He is shattering the fetters which bind him. This is a symbol of India.

The Soviet Union is providing great aid to the state. At present Soviet-Indian cooperation encompasses all the most important spheres of life of the peoples of our countries, including economic, scientific-technical and cultural. In economic terms the noteworthy events have been the construction with Soviet aid of giant industrial plants in industry from the pioneer of our friendship, the metallurgical plant in Bhilai, to the combine in Bokaro. At present more than 70 projects in various parts of India symbolize the strength and vital force of Soviet-Indian cooperation. The enterprises built with economic and technical aid from the USSR produce 35 percent of all the steel cast in the nation, they produce 80 percent and refine 30 percent of the oil, they generate 20 percent of the electric power, and manufacture a large portion of the metallurgical, electrical engineering and mining equipment. A good start has been made to cooperation in the food, pulp-paper, light, medical and other industrial sectors. In Calcutta, construction is advancing successfully on India's first subway being built with participation of Soviet construction workers. Our cooperation is picking up speed in the area of agriculture, trade is growing and useful exchanges are continuing in the area of science and technology.

The day is drawing near when Indian and Soviet cosmonauts will make a joint flight. Our nation is also assisting India in strengthening its defense capability. We would also point out that over the years of cooperation, around 100,000 specialists with a higher and secondary technical education and skilled workers have been trained in schools and at enterprises built with Soviet aid in India.[4]

During our stay in Madras, close, friendly ties were established between the sailors of both countries. The sailors frequently met and spoke with one another and exchanged souvenirs. The Indian sailors envied their Soviet colleagues who had modern equipment. They walked across the decks amazed and looked at the equipment with curiosity. The sailor Arvind said that he would consider it an honor to serve on such a ship.

A breakfast was given for the Soviet sailors and petty officers at Agyar. Conversations and new friendships were struck up at the tables laid out with national Indian dishes. It was pleasant to hear that some of our sailors spoke English and the Indians spoke Russian. The hosts of the meeting showed particular interest in the officer candidates.

The sailors spoke about the length and rules of service, about the conditions of training and their life, they joked, laughed, photographed each other and exchanged addresses....

The Soviet sailors were lucky. Having visited Madras, they left for Bombay, the main Indian Navy base. In escorting us, the Indian sailors asserted that a complete idea about their navy could be gained only in Bombay. The detachment of Soviet ships left for Bombay under the flag of the detachment commander, Rear Adm N. I. Khorvin (now Admiral and Commander of the Black Sea Fleet). Adm N. N. Amel'ko, upon the end of the visit in Madras, returned home. After several days, having traveled around the peninsula, the Soviet ships arrived in Bombay, the major port of India. Before our eyes was one of the best harbors of the world. Etched against the tropical sun were attractive buildings on the shore surrounded in palm trees. Along the quay moved a solid flow of diverse traffic.

A surprise awaited us at a reception given the very first evening by the command of the Indian Navy on the carrier "Vikrant," the flagship of the Indian Navy. The leaders of the city had assembled on the enormous deck of the ship which was in drydock, and the senior Army and Navy officers were also present. From the carrier which towered over its surroundings there was a view of nighttime Bombay. After a brief talk, a show of women's national dresses was organized. Going up on the bridge, in front of the persons assembled and illuminated by searchlights passed the young women of India, the wives of naval officers dressed in attractive saris.

From the first day of the visit in Bombay, each measure was carried out under the motto of friendship. Thousands of fans assembled for a soccer match between the Soviet and Indian teams. The commander of the naval forces of the Indian West Coast and the commander of the detachment of Soviet ships were present at the palm-surrounded stadium. Before the start of the game they went out on the field and wished the soccer players success. After the match, Vice Adm S. M. Nanda presented gifts to our players.

The Indian sailors welcomed the Soviet guests warmly and joyfully. They seemingly had provided for everything. They acquainted us with their life, training and service. Trips through the city, meetings of sailors from both countries, concerts, and sports events broadened the range of knowledge of our sailors about India and its navy.

The concern given by the Indian classical dance artists on the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy" has remained long in our memory. In the evening on the poop in the searchlight beams, Indian national dances were demonstrated. They extolled the labor and life of the simple people, they glorified the beauty and agility of man and expressed the thoughts and feelings of the people. Through the complex patterns of the dance the soul, the character of the people and their freedom-loving and proud spirit were disclosed. The crew thanked the artists for their high art with loud and ardent applause.

A group of officer candidates from the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S. O. Makarov who were undergoing training on our ships visited one of the military colleges where specialists were trained for the army, navy and air force. The college possesses everything needed for training: a well-trained faculty, rich training facilities and light and spacious auditoriums. The curriculum includes many subjects. Training is organized considering the latest scientific and technical achievements. Admission to the school is by competition and they admit only those who have a secondary education. Initially the officer candidates study the principles of military affairs and then undergo special training in the schools. After this they are given an officer rank.

The sailors of the Pacific Fleet spent 6 days in friendly India. During this time they better learned the life of the simple people, their habits and morals and became acquainted with the sailors, their training and service. The acquaintance was reciprocal. By their exemplary appearance, conduct and pleasantness, our sailors left a good impression in the hearts of the Indian workers.

The Indian press covered our visit favorably. The newspaper INDIAN EXPRESS on 4 April 1968 wrote about our musical troup: "The Russian Red Banner Pacific Fleet has a concert troup which is as rich in amusing talents as the ships of the detachment are rich in weapons."

The Indians welcomed the Soviet sailors warmly and cordially but even with greater emotion and solemnness, almost tinged with sadness and regret, saw us off from Bombay. The crew members of the vessels in the roadsteads wished us a good voyage. In response our sailors, petty officers and officers formed up on the upper deck thought to ourselves: "Until we meet again, India!"

I recalled all of this when I read in the newspapers, heard over the radio and saw on the TV set the reports on the visit in December 1980 to India by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, as well as about the stay of the President of India N. S. Reddy in our nation. There was much that was in common in these meetings and visits, but above all an ardent desire of both great peoples to strengthen friendship. Regular political contacts and reciprocal friendly visits by the leaders of both countries have become an inseparable and important part of the relations between the USSR and India. They provide an opportunity to sum up what has been accomplished and outline new goals for the development of relations between our states.

FOOTNOTES

[1] PRAVDA, 13 December 1980.

[2] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 December 1980.

[3] PRAVDA, 9 December 1980.

[4] PRAVDA, 11 December 1980.

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COMBAT TRADITIONS: NAVY COMRADESHIP DESCRIBED

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[Article published under the heading "Combat Traditions" by Rear Adm I. Petrov: "Naval Cohesion"]

[Text] Naval cohesion...these words very accurately and fully disclose the essence of the tradition of military comradeship in the Navy which goes back far in the centuries. It arose and grew stronger in the struggle of the Russian people against foreign invaders for the honor and independence of the fatherland. The idea of defending the homeland was at the basis of troop fraternity. Precisely this idea has determined the strength of the tradition and its persistence in the Russian army in contrast to the armies manned by mercenaries.

The military comradeship which had developed in Russia was commented on by F. Engels: "The Russian soldier, undoubtedly, is very brave. As long as the tactical task was carried out by an advance of the infantry masses fighting in a closed order, the Russian soldier was in his element. All his experience in life had taught him to keep close to his comrades. In the village there still is a semicommunistic commune and in the city the cooperative labor of the artel, everywhere, the 'krugovaja poruka,' that is, mutual responsibility of the comrades for each other; in a word, the very social system clearly shows that, on the one hand, all salvation lies in solidarity, and on the other, the separate individual given his own initiative is doomed to complete impotence. This trait has also survived among the Russians in military affairs: unified into battalions the Russian masses can almost not be broken apart; the greater the danger the more tightly they pull together in a single compact whole."[1]

The prominent military leaders of the Army and Navy have endeavored to use this national trait of the Russian people, comradeship. During peacetime this was done in training and indoctrinating the men and in a combat situation for raising their morale and for victory over the enemy. Thus, in the course of the heroic defense of Sevastopol' on 15 September 1854, the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Adm V. A. Kornilov, exhorted the defenders of the city: "...We will fight to the last man. There is nowhere to retreat, the sea is behind us. I forbid all chiefs to sound the retreat.... Comrades, if I ordered to sound the retreat, do not obey and who of you will be the scoundrel that does not kill me...."[2] With good reason the experienced military chief used the word "comrade." And this was under the conditions of serf-owning Russia, when there could be no question of social equality, when the soldiers and sailors were called the "lower ranks" and the officers were "sirs!" Such an appeal united the men, it raised their responsibility for defending the homeland and inspired them to heroic deeds as is confirmed by the well-known feats of Sn Petr Koshka and Dasha Sevastopol'skaya.

Regardless of the caste system and the rigid rules in the army of serf-owning Russia, the best Russian naval and army leaders endeavored to develop a feeling of affection for the commanders among the soldiers and sailors. Simultaneously they demanded respect for the human dignity of their subordinates. And those chiefs who along with the rank and file endured all the hardships of combat life and courageously fought on the battlefields, who saw in a subordinate an equal defender of Russia and were concerned for him, such commanders the men considered it their duty to defend without thinking about their own life. A participant in the defense of Sevastopol', Sn Ignatiy Shevchenko, during a sortie into the enemy camp protected Lt N. Biryulev with his own body and saved the commander at the price of his own life. The commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in the Crimea, on 2 February 1855, issued a special order in which he commended the "special example of the sailor's bravery and self-sacrifice" and congratulated the defenders of Sevastopol' for "having in their ranks a comrade of whom they should be fully proud."[3] The picture by the artist V. Makovskiy has captured the feat of I. Shevchenko [not reproduced].

Among the Russian sailors, a feeling of comradeship and mutual aid has been manifested not only in terms of fellow countrymen but for all persons needing help. Thus, during the night of 15 December 1908, there was a powerful earthquake in the Italian city of Messina. The Russian ships in the Mediterranean hurried to help. The sailors and all the medical personnel for 5 days rescued people from the flames and from under ruins. In the following year the Italians struck a medal in honor of the Russian sailors and erected a monument in the center of Messina. It should be pointed out that at that time the British cruiser "Sutley" was in the roadsteads of the city. But the English came to help the suffering inhabitants only at the end of the rescue work.

The tradition of military fraternity and a helping hand has become a firm part of the life of the Soviet Armed Forces having assumed a fundamentally new quality. After the victory of October, the men were defending not only their homeland but also Soviet power. The idea of defending the socialist fatherland strengthened the tradition and raised it to a higher level. Now it reflects the socialist nature of Soviet society and its Armed Forces as well as the uniform social composition of the Soviet Army and Navy. Our men are united by common political goals and interests, by loyalty to the motherland and by a belief in the ideals of communism. And when we speak about naval comradeship, we understand a collective of sailors united by a single communist ideology and by an understanding of the responsibility for the security of the motherland and brought together by ship life. The specific features of naval service and its influence on the shaping of the personality were very accurately depicted by the remarkable Russian pedagogue K. D. Ushinskiy: "The character of a sailor, in being formed in the very history of the fleet, where storms and battles fill every page, later is transferred very easily and quickly from one personality to another, from one generation of sailors to another. The new man on board a ship, in being surrounded by the energetic natures of the older sailors, quickly and wholeheartedly falls under their influence and picks up their character which has been formed over the centuries."[4]

In actuality, on a ship, as nowhere else, there is a great dependence among the crew members, particularly on submarines. The safe journey and successful carrying out of the combat mission depend upon the skill, endurance and tenacity of each of them.

Naval friendship is one of the greatest moral values. It was strengthened and tempered in the flames of Great October, in the fire of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars and in the military deeds of all generations of Soviet sailors. Probably there have been more stories told and more songs sung about naval friendship than about anything else as here there is much moral purity and strength, unstinting loyalty and beauty of feelings. It is no accident that the well-known naval writer L. S. Sobolev called it the "naval soul." "The naval soul is unprejudiced military friendship, a readiness to support a comrade in battle, to rescue a wounded man and defend the commander and commissar with your life."[5]

There have been numerous forms for the manifestation of naval fraternity. The history of the Navy preserves many examples of the courage of sailors in combat and their manifesting of high moral qualities in saving a ship or combat comrades, particularly during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Thus, the crews of the escort vessels "Passat" and "Tuman" carried out collective feats. On 12 July 1941, the "Passat," which had been converted from a fishing trawler and had just two 45-mm cannons and two machine guns as weapons, engaged in uneven battle three German destroyers in order to protect the vessels being escorted. The sailors continued firing at the enemy until the much-damaged vessel sank below the water. The escort vessel "Tuman" fought just as courageously against superior enemy forces.

On Malaya Zemlya a mortal feat was carried out by the communist, Jr Sgt M. M. Kornitskiy. A group of naval landing troops on 5 February 1943 broke into the settlement of Stanichka and having secured the school, took up the defensive. The Nazis surrounded the building, they set it afire with a shell and, having concentrated around the stone wall were preparing for the attack. The situation seemed hopeless. Having fastened several grenades to his shoulder belt and picking up an antitank grenade in his hand, Kornitskiy jumped up to the top of the wall and threw himself into the middle of the Nazis. There was a great explosion. At the price of his own life the junior sergeant helped his comrades break out of the encirclement. The courageous Black Sea sailor was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Great Patriotic War provided unsurpassed examples of combat cooperation among the men from the various branches of troops. The Soviet soldiers acted according to the famous rule: "All for one, one for all." The actions of the landing detachment under the command of Sr Lt K. F. Ol'shanskiy in March 1944 were an example of direct cooperation between the sailors and infantrymen. For 2 days, 55 sailors, 12 combat engineers and signalmen who had landed in the port of the town of Nikolayev which had been captured by the Nazis courageously drove off the attacks of large enemy forces. They killed up to 700 enemy soldiers and officers. By their courageousness the sailors and infantrymen made it easier for our units to take the city. All participants in the landing were given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Armed Forces the tradition of defending the commander in combat has assumed a different content. It is based upon the new, socialist relations between people and on a unity of class interests. Our soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, officers, generals and admirals are class brothers and they serve the same great cause of communism. To defend the commander is a higher manifestation of military comradeship. The Soviet commander has been given great trust by the party and government and bears full responsibility for carrying out the set mission. In protecting and defending his life, the men thereby maintain the combat capability of the subunit or unit. Many such examples are known in the navy. On 1 July 1944, our torpedo boat was hit and caught fire in a battle. The ship's commander and the staff officer who was on board, having received severe wounds, lost consciousness. The CPO G. I. Matyukhin and PO 2d Class V. D. Kuskov (themselves wounded) put life preservers on the officers and lowered them into the water. Several minutes later the boat sank. For over 2 hours the heroes supported the wounded in the water until they were picked up by a torpedo boat. The Baltic sailors G. I. Matyukhin and V. D. Kuskov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In turn, the Soviet commanders with equal bravery protect the life of their comrades in arms. The enemy unexpectedly detected the submarine Shch-403 under the command of Lt-Capt S. I. Kovalenko. A machine gun burst severely wounded the commander who was on the bridge. The life of the crew was in danger and seconds would determine the outcome. Then Kovalenko, gathering his last strength, ordered: "I am finished, dive without me!" The order was carried out and the sub saved.[6]

The friendship among the peoples of our multinational nation has been one of the sources of victory for the Soviet Union in the last war. In a single formation the Russians and Ukrainians, Belorussians and Armenians, Georgians and Lithuanians, Kazakhs and Moldavians defended the fatherland and helped one another master the weapons and equipment and defeat the enemy in battle. The submariner Hero of the Soviet Union I. A. Kolyshkin has recalled that once in a conversation with him an English officer had complained of the "driven in" recruits: "...The Welsh are stubborn and their language is gibberish.... There would never be any possibility of dealing with them and instilling true naval order." "I replied to the Englishman," writes I. A. Kolyshkin, "that for us such difficulties are simply inconceivable. On our boats you can meet the representatives of many nationalities and everyone perfectly understands what service demands from them.... And those who are not good in Russian are helped by comrades...."[7]

In the postwar period, in line with the scientific and technical revolution in military affairs, the demands have increased on the moral-political and psychological preparation of the Army and Navy personnel. In carrying out this task a major role has been assigned to indoctrinating the men in the revolutionary and military traditions. This has been reflected in the regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces. In particular, the "Naval Regulations of the USSR Navy," among the tasks of political work, point to the necessity of developing a "close-knit combat collective" and indoctrinating the "sailors, petty officers, warrant officers ['michman'] and officers in the revolutionary and military traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy...in a spirit of military comradeship, mutual support and help in combat and combat cooperation with the navies and armies of the socialist countries...."[8]

The tempering of navy friendship is being continued at present in ocean cruises, in exercises and in daily service. The finest qualities of the sailors are manifested precisely in difficult moments. All the fleets know the names of the peacetime heroes who have been loyal to naval fraternity. The Northern Fleet submariner, PO 1st Class A. Korolev, in a smoke-filled compartment, took off his gasmask and put it on the officer who had lost consciousness. The Black Sea sailors remember Sr Lt V. I. Skosyrskiy who died like a hero but also saved the life of a sailor. They also remember the naval pilot Capt V. V. Kubrakov. At the price of his life he saved the crew of a missile-carrying aircraft and protected the inhabitants of a settlement which could have been hit by the aircraft. His feat was described in a leaflet put out by the political directorate of the Black Sea Fleet. A street and school in the settlement have been named after the pilot. The Pacific Fleet sailor, WO ["praporshchik"] A. Zharkov, an instructor at the political section for Komsomol work, in putting out a fire in the taiga, rushed into the very blaze thinking that a comrade had been caught there. He did not know that this soldier had reached safety in a different place. Aleksandr Zharkov entered the flames as he could not act otherwise. He was awarded the Order of the Red Star posthumously.

The sailors are profoundly aware that under present-day conditions, troop comradeship has assumed an international nature. The strong friendship among the men of the fraternal Warsaw Pact countries can serve as a vivid example. The crew of the naval infantry armored personnel carrier of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet headed by Capt Yu. Roslyakov was decorated by the commander of the Polish Navy for courage and the unstinting manifestation of troop comradeship in joint actions with the Polish sailors.

How in tune are these deeds with the immortal combat feats of the sailors during the years of the Great Patriotic War. How clearly and starkly aware are we of the permanent value and profound social significance of Soviet naval comradeship.

The solidarity of a collective and close ties do not come automatically or just out of the specific features of naval service. They are apparent where constant and consistent work is carried out by the command, the party and Komsomol organizations in shaping a healthy moral climate and the political maturity of the collective. To be concerned for the strengthening of comradeship means to bring the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism into the masses of soldiers, to instill in them a feeling of responsibility to society and indoctrinate pride for belonging in the naval collective.

The service of navy personnel has assumed a particular content during the days when the Soviet people have begun to carry out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Surrounded by the affection and concern of all the people and united into a friendly military family, the sailors, like all our military, are vigilantly standing watch and are ready to rebuff any aggressor who dares encroach on the freedom and independence of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries.

FOOTNOTES

[1] K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], 2d Edition, Vol 22, p 403.

[2] "Iz boyevogo proshlogo russkoy armii" [From the Military Past of the Russian Army], Voyenizdat, 1947, p 213.

[3] "Muzey Krasnoznamennogo Chernomorskogo flota" [The Museum of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet], Simferopol', Tavriya, 1977, p 20.

[4] K. D. Ushinskiy, ["Works"], Vol 1, Moscow, Gosizdat, 1948, p 314.

[5] L. Sobolev, "Morskaya dusha" [The Naval Soul], Moscow, Sovetskiy Pisatel', 1947, pp 383-384.

[6] "V studenykh glubinakh" [In the Cold Depths], Voyenizdat, 1980, p 104.

[7] I. A. Kolyshkin, "V glubinakh polyarnykh morey" [In the Depths of the Polar Seas], Voyenizdat, 1970, p 211.

[8] "Korabel'nyy ustav Voyenno-Morskogo Flota SSSR" [Naval Regulations of the USSR Navy], Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 42, 43.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: EMPLOYMENT OF TANK ARMIES

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Information" by Col (Res) G. Chernykh: "On the Employment of the 6th Guards Tank Army in the First Echelon of a Front"]

[Text] In the front-level offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, the tank armies were basically employed as echelons for following up on the success. However, in a number of operations they also operated in the first operational echelon of the front's troops.

The 5th Tank Army in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad (November 1942) and the 3d Tank Army in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh' (January 1943) Offensive Operation were used for the first time in this echelon of a front. However the designated experience was not typical as the tank formations, in addition to the tank corps, included rifle divisions and cavalry corps. The incorporation of rifle formations reduced the maneuverability of the tank army as a whole, it complicated troop control and caused difficulties in their logistical support.

The most characteristic was the use of tank armies of uniform composition (as a rule, they consisted of two tank and one mechanized corps) in the first echelon of a front. This occurred when the enemy defenses had a focal nature and were not sufficiently prepared in antitank terms.

In fighting in the first echelon of a front, the tank armies helped to make a powerful initial strike against the enemy, to quickly overcome its tactical defenses, to shift the efforts of the advancing forces in depth as well as to increase the average daily momentum of advance.

In the given article, an attempt has been made to generalize (as the most instructive) the experience of employing the sixth (6th Guards) Tank Army in the first echelon of a front. It was used for the first time in the first echelon of a front in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation (January-February 1944).

According to the plan of the commander of the First Ukrainian Front, the task of the field force was to break through the enemy defenses by a powerful strike and in developing the offensive, on the second day of the operation to link up with the mobile forces of the Second Ukrainian Front in the region of Zvenigorodka and to surround the enemy grouping in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy salient.[1] Since, proceeding from the planned high-average momentum of advance, the enemy was to be encircled within a short period of time and the enemy defenses were shallow, the 6th Tank Army was able to carry out this task more successfully than the combined-arms field forces. For this reason it was put in the first echelon of the strike grouping. The combat task received by the 6th Tank Army determined the operational configuration of its troops. It was a double echelon one. Upon the decision of the army commander, the V Mechanized Corps was the first to move up. In cooperation with the artillery and aviation, it was to break through the enemy tactical defensive zone and create conditions for the rapid development of the offensive. In the second echelon was the V Guards Tank Corps which was to reinforce the attack of the mechanized corps and break through into the operational depth. The battle orders of the formation were also formed up in two echelons. In the army a forward detachment was organized consisting of a tank brigade reinforced by a self-propelled artillery regiment, a motorized rifle battalion and a tank killing battery. In operating on an independent sector, it was to break through into the depth of the enemy defenses and, in skirting the strongpoints, reach the region of Zvenigorodka. The raiding actions of the detachment were of important significance for the success of the main forces of the 6th Tank Army.

On 26 January 1944, the troops of the army broke through the tactical defensive zone. Its forward detachment on the third day of the offensive had linked up with the forward units of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Second Ukrainian Front. The encirclement of the enemy was fully complete. Subsequently the 6th Tank Army was regrouped on the external perimeter of encirclement where it together with the 5th Guards Tank Army went over to positional defenses. The strong external perimeter of encirclement created by these field forces helped to successfully repel the enemy attempt to relieve their encircled grouping.

In the offensive operations to liberate the countries of Southeast Europe, the 6th Guards Tank Army[2] became part of the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front and fought in the first operational echelon in the Debrecen and Budapest operations.

In the Debrecen Operation, Hq SHC ordered the Second Ukrainian Front to attack in a northernly axis skirting Debrecen on the west, to capture the center of resistance at Oradea and reach the Tisza River.

Proceeding from the fact that the enemy tactical defensive zone was of a focal nature and it could be crossed in a short time, the commander of the front resolved to make the main thrust from the region of Oradea to Debrecen using the forces of the 6th Guards Tank Army and a horse-mechanized group (KMG).

The tank field force was given the mission: to advance in the first echelon and in cooperation with the KMG and to break through the enemy defenses and then exploit the success in depth.

By the start of the operation the 6th Guards Tank Army included a tank and a mechanized corps, self-propelled artillery, light artillery and tank killing artillery brigades, an antiaircraft artillery division and separate units. During the breakthrough of the defenses, the army was assigned the XXXIII Rifle Corps consisting of the 78th and 337th Rifle Division and two Romanian infantry divisions (the First

Infantry Division and the Third Guards Rifle Division). As a total the army had 188 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], more than 980 guns and mortars,[3] it was supported by one ground attack air division and was covered from the air by two regiments of a fighter air division.

The army commander decided to break through the enemy defenses in a sector 10 km wide using the adjacent flanks of the tank and mechanized corps formed up for making a strong initial thrust into one echelon. In the reserve were the tank and guards mortar [rocket] regiments. Our rifle and the Romanian divisions were deployed on the army flanks in order to protect its assault grouping from enemy counterattacks as the field force did not have any direct adjacent units. The immediate task of the army was set to a depth of 30 km and consisted in capturing the strong center of resistance, the town of Oradea. Subsequently the capture of Debrecen was planned. And the depth of the following task equaled 80 km.

The Debrecen Operation commenced in the morning of 6 October after brief artillery and air softening up. However, due to the insufficient artillery density, the enemy defenses were not fully neutralized. For this reason immediately with the start of the offensive the enemy put up fierce resistance and counterattacked. By the end of the third day of the operation, the army had broken through to a depth of 15-18 km and was forced to halt on the approaches to Oradea having lost a significant number of tanks. The basic reason for the low momentum of its advance in breaking through the tactical defensive zone was the poor neutralizing of the enemy as well as the insufficient use of the tactical maneuver of the tanks and SAU in attacking the strongpoints.

In the existing situation, for rapidly taking the town of Oradea, the decision was made to carry out a concentric attack by the forces of the KMG from the northwest, the 6th Guards Tank Army from the west and by the attached XXXIII Rifle Corps from the south. As a result, on 12 October 1944, the enemy grouping in the area of this town was defeated and the tank army was able to develop the offensive to the north. Its corps together with the formations of the KMG on 20 October captured the city of Debrecen. The combat operations of the Second Ukrainian Front in the Budapest Operation were characterized by the employment of the 6th Guards Tank Army in the first echelon of the front in a separate sector. This was explained by the fact that in the sector of the main thrust it would have to fight in mountainous wooded terrain against a strong enemy grouping and in addition cross the Ipel' and Hron rivers. For this reason it was better for the tank army to be used for an offensive to the northwest with the task of rapidly breaking through the enemy focal defenses and to rapidly develop the offensive in depth in order to envelop the flank of the enemy grouping fighting in the mountainous wooded area, to force it to retreat and to securely cover the main attack grouping of the front against possible counterstrikes by enemy tank troops from the north.[4] Such a plan helped to achieve surprise and could positively influence the general course of the offensive. The units of three German divisions and one brigade were defending the zone of the planned offensive by the tank army some 12 km wide. The defenses were shallow and consisted of individual strongpoints. The enemy did not have reserves in this sector.

By the start of the offensive the tank army had 229 tanks and SAU, 390 guns and mortars and 16 rocket launchers.[5]

In considering the nature of the enemy defenses, its men and equipment, the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army decided to organize the troops into a single echelon and make the main thrust with the V Guards Tank Corps. The task for the first day was set to a depth of up to 35 km and the axis for the subsequent offensive was also given. As a total 3 days were allocated for preparing for combat operations and for regrouping the army formations. The actions of the tank army were supported by the aviation of the 5th Air Army. The offensive started on 20 December after a 10-minute bombardment against the enemy defensive strongpoints. The brigades of the corps rapidly broke through the defenses, advanced in depth and by the end of the day had reached the area of Levice, in carrying out the set mission. However, on the next day there came a strong enemy counterstrike from the mountainous wooded area against the base of the breakthrough. By the end of 22 December, the enemy had reached the rear of the field force. Under the existing situation, the main forces of the tank army had to turn south for the purpose of attacking the rear of the Nazi counterstrike grouping and to defeat it in cooperation with the troops of the 7th Guards Army. This mission was carried out by the end of 26 December. On the same day the tank army reached the Danube and linked up with the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front. The enemy Budapest grouping was surrounded.

The success of the 6th Guards Tank Army in the operation was ensured by the surprise of the attack, by the enterprising and decisive actions of the tank and mechanized brigades in the operational depth and by the effective support of them by the ground attack aviation from the 5th Air Army.

Particular attention should be given to the experience of employing the 6th Guards Tank Army in the Khingan-Mukden Operation of the Transbaykal Front in August 1945.

According to the plan of Hq SHC, the front was to make the main thrust from the area of Tamtsak-Bulak in the general direction of Chanchun in order, in cooperation with the troops of the First and Second Far Eastern fronts, to cut off, encircle and destroy the basic forces of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

The success of the front's offensive operation depended largely upon the rapid crossing of the Greater Khingan Range. Such a task could be successfully carried out only with a powerful, very mobile operational field force in the first echelon of the assault grouping of the front's troops. This led to a situation where the 6th Guards Tank Army was put in the first echelon. It had to quickly cross the Greater Khingan Range and, having secured the passes with a portion of the forces, with the main forces to capture a line up to 450 km in depth no later than the fifth day of the operation. Subsequently the army was to develop the offensive toward Chanchun and Mukden, to capture these areas and thereby ensure that the main forces of the front attained the ultimate goal of the operation. The total depth of the front's operation was 600-800 km and the depth of the immediate task for the tank army was 450 km. The average daily momentum of advance was to be up to 90 km.

Considering the very important role of the tank army in the operation, two motorized rifle divisions, two self-propelled artillery brigades and four separate light tank battalions were additionally included in its composition, in addition to the existing two mechanized corps and one tank corps. As a total by the start of the operation the army had 1,019 tanks and SAU, 118 armored vehicles, around 950 guns and mortars, 165 antiaircraft guns, around 6,500 motor vehicles and almost 950 motorcycles.[6] Proceeding from the terrain conditions and the nature of the combat missions, the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army decided to put the mechanized corps in the first echelon, with the tank corps in the second behind the right-flank mechanized corps.

The offensive by the 6th Guards Tank Army started during the night of 8-9 August without artillery softening up. The main forces of the corps, in following the forward detachments in the columns, crossed the state frontier and moved forward rapidly. On the second day of the operation they had advanced to the Greater Khingan and by the end of the third day had crossed the mountain range and on the 10-11th day of the operation its formations had reached Chanchun and Mukden, brilliantly carrying out the task set for the front.

The success of the 6th Guards Tank Army in this operation was brought about by the steady troop control and by the able and broad use of the forward detachments.

In speaking about the breakthrough of enemy defenses in the designated operations, it is essential to emphasize that depending upon the situation, the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army crushed the defenses either on the move (the Debrecen and Khingan-Mukden operations) or from a position of direct contact with the enemy (Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy and Budapest operations). An offensive from a march formation was preceded by the moving up of the troops from the interior or by their regrouping over a significant distance. The given method, as a rule, helped to achieve surprise and ensured a more rapid momentum of advance.

A particular feature of the use of the 6th Guards Tank Army in the first echelon of a front was that in carrying out the operations a number of difficulties arose caused by objective circumstances. The main one was the very limited time of preparation (3 days in the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, 2 days in the Debrecen and 2 days in the Budapest). This time did not make it possible to carry out a more detailed study of the enemy and supply the troops of the field force with the required amount of logistical support. As a consequence of this additional losses occurred in breaking through the enemy tactical defensive zone and there was a low momentum (with the exception of the Khingan-Mukden Operation) in comparison with the operations of tank armies where they were used as mobile groups. However, the 6th Guards Tank Army successfully carried out the set missions. And although its use in the first echelon of a front in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War was a comparatively rare phenomenon, it showed, however, that such a variation cannot be excluded. It can be particularly effective in breaking through a weak enemy defense. For this reason, the experience of the 6th Guards Tank Army merits a careful study and analysis and can be useful in training commanders and staffs today.

FOOTNOTES

[1] TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 236, inv. 2673, file 974, sheets 145-147.

[2] The 6th Tank Army became a guards army on 12 September 1944.

[3] VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1975, p 71.

[4] "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 9, Voyenizdat, 1978, p 199.

[5] VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1973, p 65.

[6] "Final" [The Finale], Moscow, Nauka, 1966, pp 95-96; TsAMO, folio 210, inv. 3116, file 294, sheets 107-119.

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EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET JET AVIATION

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[Article published under the heading: "Scientific Information" by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col (Res) B. Danilov: "From the History of the Development of Jet Aviation"]

[Text] From the first days of Soviet power, the Communist Party has shown unceasing concern for the development of science and technology, seeing in this the guarantee for the successful construction of socialism and the strengthening of the nation's defense might. It has created all conditions for the fruitful work of scientists and has inspired them to creative searches.

In carrying out the party's instructions, the scientists have solved the most diverse questions. At the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's, a number of young scientists focused attention on the problems of jet propulsion. It must be said that by this time the theoretical bases had already been provided for the possibility of developing a jet aircraft. This idea had been proposed and worked out by the prominent Russian and Soviet scientists and inventors N. I. Kibal'chich, K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, F. A. Tsander, B. S. Stechkin and others. Even in the 1880's, N. I. Kibal'chich had made a diagram of a jet aircraft.

The works of the scientist and inventor K. E. Tsiolkovskiy hold an exceptional place in elaborating the problems of jet propulsion. In 1903, he published a remarkable theoretical work "Issledovaniye mirovykh prostranstv reaktivnymi priborami" [Research on World Expanses by Jet Instruments] in which, in essence, for the first time started the science of jet propulsion and established the principles of modern jet engineering. In 1930, in the work "Reaktivnyy aeroplan" [A Jet Airplane], Tsiolkovskiy showed the advantages of such an aircraft in comparison with a piston-driven one and advanced the supposition that "after the age of prop airplanes there should come the age of jet airplanes."[1]

The bases for the development of the various types of jet engines were established by Prof B. S. Stechkin. His work "Teoriya vozdushno-reaktivnykh dvigateley" [The Theory of Air Jet Engines] was the first scientific work in world literature in this area.

At the beginning of the 1930's, the problem of developing jet technology became particularly acute The desire to increase the speed and altitude of combat aircraft forced the scientists and designers to seek out new paths for this. The chief of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Air Force Directorate, Ya. I. Alksnis, in January 1933, reported to the chairman of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council]: "In the experimental and research work we must speed up the development of gas turbines and jet engines."[2] The Red Army chief of weaponry M. N. Tukhachevskiy wrote that "the use of a jet motor in aviation will ultimately lead to the solution to the problem of flights in the stratosphere and at enormous speeds."[3] Considering this, the party and the government undertook measures to accelerate work in this area.

On 9 July 1932, the Defense Commission of the USSR SNK [Soviet of People's Commissars] adopted a decree which provided for the carrying out of extensive research and practical work on the questions of a gas turbine, a jet engine and an aircraft with this engine.[4] In September 1933, by a decision of the Council for Labor and Defense, in Moscow the world's first Jet Scientific Research Institute (RNII) was organized.[5] It was headed by the strong supporter of jet engineering I. T. Kleymenov and his deputy was S. P. Korolev. The institute commenced intense scientific research and design work on developing jet engines and aircraft. In the second half of the 1930's, the first attempts were made to mount these engines on an aircraft.

In 1937-1938, the designer S. P. Korolev built the SK-9 (RP-318) rocket airplane with a liquid propellent rocket engine designed by L. S. Dushkin. On 28 February 1940, the pilot V. F. Fedorov made the first flight in the USSR on the rocket airplane.

With each passing year the work of developing high speed jet aircraft assumed ever-greater scope. On 12 July 1940, the Defense Committee under the USSR SNK adopted a decree which defined the prospects for the further development of jet aviation technology. The plan adopted by the Committee envisaged research on questions "about the use of high-powered jet engines for supersonic stratospheric flights as well as the carrying out of work on turbojet engines (TRD) designed by A. M. Lyul'ka in order to stand test the engine in December 1940."[6] Precisely the work of developing the TRD lay at the basis of the future development of aviation.[7]

The war which broke out greatly impeded the work but it was not halted. Even on 1 August 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) in a special decree obliged the designer V. F. Bolkhovitinov to build a jet fighter interceptor with powerful weapons.[8] The aircraft was created and on 15 May 1942, the test pilot G. Ya. Bakhchivandzhi made the first flight on it. However, it was not possible to complete the testing program as the aircraft suffered a disaster in one of the flights. The courageous communist pilot perished having performed a feat in the interests of scientific development.

In July and November 1942, the GKO adopted decrees which obliged the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry (NKAP) to design and build a new jet interceptor which could fly for 20 minutes and to produce a series of 30 such aircraft.[9] For carrying out this assignment, a special design bureau was organized at the RNII. However, the difficult situation on the front of the struggle against the Nazi invaders impeded the implementation of the designated plan.

The GKO decree of 18 February 1944 provided a new impetus in the development of jet aviation technology.[10] Under the NKAP there was organized a special scientific research institute (NII-1) which was to be concerned with research and design work. At the NII-1 there were assembled groups of designers who had worked previously on jet engines and these were headed by V. P. Glushko, L. S. Dushkin, A. M. Lyul'ka, A. M. Isayev and M. M. Bondaryuk who up to this time had been in various organizations and plants. The setting up of the new institute put an end to the separation of the individual collectives and persons concerned with jet technology. The decree obliged the NKAP within a 1-month time to submit specific proposals on constructing jet engines and jet aircraft.

The GKO decree of 22 May 1944 outlined an extensive program for the construction of jet aviation technology.[11] The leading aircraft design bureaus of A. S. Yakovlev, A. I. Mikoyan, P. O. Sukhoy and S. A. Lavochkin were given the task in 1944-1945 of each creating an individual fighter with a jet engine,[12] while the designers V. P. Glushko, L. S. Dushkin and A. M. Isayev were to design the prototypes of liquid-propellent rocket engines and the designers A. M. Lyul'ka and V. V. Uvarov were to design turbojet engines. Simultaneously one of the engine-building plants was converted to serial production of jet engines.

In carrying out the assignments of the party and the government, the designers L. S. Dushkin and A. M. Isayev in 1944 created a ZhRD [liquid propellent rocket engine] with a thrust of 1,500 kg and this successfully underwent state testing.[13] In the same year, V. P. Glushko build the RD-lkhz engine the use of which as a booster on the YaK-3, LA-7 PE-2 and SU-7 aircraft provided an increase in speed from 100 to 130 km per hour.

Thus, even in the prewar years and during the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party and the Soviet government made a great effort to develop jet aviation technology in our nation. A definite base was created which subsequently was used for developing jet aircraft building in the postwar years.

At the end of 1945, the development prospects of aviation were discussed repeatedly and in detail at the Party Central Committee and in the government. In February 1946, the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the USSR SNK adopted a decree which provided for an entire range of measures aimed at broadening the existing scientific research organizations and experimental design facilities of the aviation industry as well as improving experimental construction of jet aircraft, engines and special equipment. The Soviet scientists focused chief attention on elaborating the theoretical problems in the area of aerodynamics, jet engine theory and aircraft design. Everything had to be done so that in the immediate future we would surpass the scientific achievements outside our country. At the same time there were plans to create and serially produce fighters with speeds up to 950 km per hour and bombers up to 800 km per hour as well as experimental aircraft for supersonic flights. Accelerated construction was planned for the experimental plants of the designers A. S. Yakovlev, A. I. Mikoyan and S. V. Il'yushin. The design bureaus of A. N. Tupolev, P. O. Sukhoy and S. A. Lavochkin were strengthened. The basic engine-building design bureaus and primarily those of V. Ya. Klimov and A. A. Mikulin were involved in the work of developing the jet engines.

Having clearly defined the basic areas for the development of aviation science and technology, the party undertook extensive organizational work. The necessary conditions were created for the aviation designers for creative activities. S. A. Lavochkin, in recalling the work done then, has said that in 1946, in the area of equipping the prototypes and their organization a leap forward was taken which was unprecedented for our aviation.

Basic attention was given to creating a reliable turbojet engine. This problem was the most difficult. But with the active help from the party bodies of the NKAP and Air Force, the scientists and designers were able to solve it successfully. In 1946, serial production started on the RD-10 (thrust 900 kg) and RD-20 (thrust 800 kg) jet engines and these were installed on experimental YaK-15 and MIG-9 jet aircraft[14] which had been developed in the same year by the design bureau collectives of A. S. Yakovlev and A. I. Mikoyan. On 24 April 1946, exactly 35 years ago, the test pilots, communists M. I. Ivanov and A. Ye. Grinchik, made the first flights on these aircraft, and on 18 August 1946, a group of jet aircraft for the first time participated in the air parade at Tushino.

In 1946, the design bureaus of P. O. Sukhoy and S. A. Lavochkin successfully carried out their tasks having built the SU-9 and LA-150 aircraft. In 1947, the LA-160 experimental aircraft was developed and this was the first Soviet swept-wing aircraft which was to play an exceptionally important role in the subsequent development of high-speed aviation.

In 1947, the party and government confronted the designers with the task of developing dependable, high-speed and high performance fighters and tactical bombers and this was still another step forward in the development of aviation technology. For this it was essential to build new, more powerful and economic engines. The designers and scientists successfully carried out this task. In August 1948, the engine building design bureau of V. Ya. Klimov created and put into serial production the RD-45 engine (with a thrust of 2,040 kg), and in November, the VK-1 engine (with a thrust of 2,700 kg). The development and production of these engines were an important stage in improving Soviet jet technology.

Major results in the work were also achieved by the design bureaus of A. M. Lyul'ka and A. A. Mikulin. The former in 1948 designed the TR-3 engine (with a thrust of 4,600 kg), and the latter in 1949-1950 produced the AMRD-2 engine (with a thrust of 4,250 kg) and the AM-3 engine which was the most powerful (with a thrust of 8,700 kg). The building of the latter made it possible to begin production of jet long-range bomber aviation.

The creation of Soviet high-powered jet engines put Soviet aviation technology in first place in the world. The foreign aviation industry at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's did not possess such aviation turbojet engines. Thus, having received more advanced engines, the aviation designers successfully carried out the task powed by the party of building aircraft the speed of which was close to that of sound.

A major stage in Soviet aviation building was the creation of the MIG-15 jet fighter at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948 by the collective of the A. I. Mikoyan design bureau. In August 1948, it was put into serial production. Several years later and the entire aviation world was talking about this aircraft. The MIG-15 was not only not inferior in its combat qualities to the analogous American aircraft

"Saber" but also surpassed it, particularly in terms of maneuvering performance. Its three cannons were also significantly more effective than the six machine guns of the Saber. Subsequently, the collective of the A. I. Mikoyan design bureau substantially improved the aircraft's aerodynamics. On the new aircraft which was subsequently named the MIG-17,[15] the test pilot I. T. Ivashchenko in May 1951 carried out flights above the speed of sound.

In November 1947, the design bureau of A. S. Yakovlev built the YaK-23 jet fighter which had good take-off and landing performance and maneuverability. At the beginning of 1948, the design bureau of S. A. Lavochkin built the LA-15 jet fighter which possessed the lowest flying weight in comparison with other analogous Soviet and foreign aircraft.

The problem of developing a tactical jet bomber was effectively solved. In 1948, the design bureaus of S. V. Il'yushin and A. N. Tupolev designed the IL-28 and TU-14 aircraft. The first had good tactical flight data for its times and it became the basic tactical bomber and reconnaissance plane in the 1950's.[16]

Thus, 3 or 4 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet scientists, designers, engineers and workers, under party leadership and relying on achievements in the economy, Soviet science and technology, had achieved outstanding successes in the development of jet aviation. A generation of jet fighters had been developed the speed of which approached that of sound. The Air Force had received a jet bomber which was incomparably more advanced in its tactical flying data than all previous aircraft.

The party and government considered the development of long-range, high-altitude and high-speed met bombers to be a most important task. In the middle of 1950, the design bureau of A. N. Tupolev began to create a jet bomber with a range of 6,000-7,000 km. The collective confidently carried out the task. The TU-16, the first swept-wing bomber, was ready, it underwent state testing and in 1952 was put into serial production. In September 1953, the Myasishchev-designed "M" heavy bomber was also put into serial production.

A major contribution to working out the problems of jet aviation development was made by the scientists of the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI), the Central Institute for Aviation Engine Building (TsIAM), the All-Union Institute for Aviation Materials (VIAM) and other scientific research facilities as well as the scientists from the air force engineer academies.

The collective of the Scientific Research Institute of the Soviet Army Air Force (GK NII VVS) played an important role in the development of jet aviation. The institute worked out the questions of operating the new equipment, it studied and tested out all the prototypes of the aircraft, aviation engines, weapons and special aircraft equipment and conducted extensive scientific research on the combat employment of aviation equipment. The Aviation Technical Committee of the Air Force set up upon the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers in July 1946 was concerned with working out the development prospects of the Air Force.

The development and putting of new types of aircraft into serial production demanded a complete reorganization of the entire aviation industry. Upon the instructions of the party Central Committee and the government, the aviation enterprises received special equipment, the production processes were improved at the plants, assembly line production was introduced and extensive work was carried out to improve the skills of the aviation industry specialists.

The production of jet technology increased rapidly. By 1953, the aviation industry had fully converted to the production of jet fighters and tactical bombers. The production of this type of piston aircraft was halted.

As the new equipment was received from industry, the Air Force was rearmed. In January 1947, the government adopted a special plan. It determined the rearming sequence, the basic initial data and directions for further improving the tactical and technical capabilities of the aircraft. Fighter aviation was first rearmed with jet equipment as the main means of ensuring the security of our motherland's air frontiers. The development of jet aircraft suitable for introduction into serial production and for rearming bomber aviation was to be completed by the end of 1948. A program was also outlined for the development of long-range aviation.

In 1946, the Air Force received its first jet aircraft the MIG-9 and YaK-15, and in 1947, the YaK-17, while in 1949 the mass rearming of fighter aviation started with the MIG-15 and LA-15 aircraft. The MIG-15 became the basic fighter of the Air Force of the Soviet Army. In August 1951, the new MIG-17 fighter was commissioned.

The rearming of tactical bomber aviation with jet equipment became possible after the aviation industry began series production of the IL-28 aircraft at the beginning of 1950. At the end of 1953, the Air Force received the TU-16 long-range jet bomber.

The technical rearming of fighter and tactical bomber aviation with first-rate jet aircraft was completed in 1953-1954. The rearming of long-range aviation was commenced. Great attention was given to improving aircraft weapons, to ensuring normal working conditions for the crew at great altitudes and speeds, to improving the quality of the radar and radio navigation gear, to creating highly productive ground servicing equipment, to building the corresponding ground bases (first-class airfields) and to equipping them with instrument landing systems.

The jet fighters were armed with the more advanced rapid-firing aviation cannons of 23- and 37-mm caliber. The cannon became the defensive weapon of the bombers. New types of unguided missiles were developed and at the beginning of the 1950's the jet fighters and bombers were armed with them. As a result of introducing the new types of weapons, the per-second salvo of a jet fighter was several-fold more powerful than the salvo of a fighter from the period of the war.

Exceptionally great importance in the postwar years was given to the development of radar equipment, and in particular, aircraft radar equipment. The party Central Committee and the Soviet government adopted a number of decisions in this area. As a result, by the beginning of the 1950's, radar sights had been developed for the jet aircraft and aviation was equipped with devices making it possible to carry out flights under instrument flying conditions during the day and at night.

The reequipping of the Air Force with new, more advanced equipment increased its combat readiness and significantly broadened the opportunities for the combat employment of the aviation units. The organizational structure of the Air Force was continuously improved and this made it possible to improve control of the aviation and to more effectively solve the questions related to the mastery of the aviation equipment, its combat employment and material support.

Soviet aviators have repeatedly demonstrated the great mastery of the new aviation equipment in the holidays in honor of USSR Air Force Day, in the course of daily combat training and in tactical flight exercises. On 3 August 1947, on Air Force Day for the first time individual and group aerobatics on jet aircraft were demonstrated by I. P. Polunin, N. I. Khramov, P. G. Solov'yev and V. V. Yefremov. For successfully mastering the new jet equipment, many pilots, engineers and technicians were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union while the pilots M. I. Ivanov, I. T. Ivashchenko, P. M. Stefanovskiy and P. Ye. Fedorov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Thus, in the first postwar period (1946-1953), there were fundamental qualitative changes in the development of our nation's Air Force related to the conversion to jet aircraft. The rearming of fighter and tactical bomber aviation with the new first-generation jet equipment was completed. The most characteristic feature of this equipment was subsonic speeds. These aircraft had more advanced weapons and equipment than their predecessors.

The history of the development of jet aviation has become an inseparable part of the history of the Soviet state, reflecting the greatness of the labor and military victories of our people.

At present the Air Force is equipped with qualitatively new aviation equipment. The combat aircraft flown by the Air Force possesses high tactical flight characteristics, modern equipment and powerful missile and cannon weapons. The successes achieved in the development of aviation have been the result of the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for strengthening the nation's defense capability.

The Soviet aviators, in carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, are steadily mastering the new generation of jet aircraft, they are improving their combat skills, they are increasing vigilance and combat readiness in every possible way and vigilantly defending the interests of our great motherland.

FOOTNOTES

[1] K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, "Sobr. soch." [Collected Works], Vol. 2, Moscow, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1954, p 338.

[2] TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 29, inv. 50, file unit 287, sheet 13.

[3] V. P. Glushko, "Raketnyye dvigateli GDL-OKB" [Rocket Engines of the GDL-OKB], Moscow, APN, 1975, p 14.

[4] TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 35, file unit 21, sheets 10-12; inv. 69, file unit 17, sheet 45.

[5] The RNII was organized on the basis of two organizations: the GDL [Gas Dynamics Laboratory] and the GIRD [Group for the Study of Jet Propulsion] which at that time were concerned with creating jet engines in our nation. The prominent party and military figures V. V. Kuybyshev, K. Ye. Voroshilov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy and others were concerned with the organization of the institute.

[6] TsGASA, folio 29, inv. 25, file unit 100, sheet 165.

[7] The first prototype of a TRD designed by A. M. Lyul'ka (the TR-1) with a thrust of 1,250 kg was manufactured in April 1945. The engine in terms of its performance exceeded the data of the German TRD, the JUMO-004 (a thrust of 900 kg) and the BMW-003 (thrust 800 kg). The first Lyul'ka engines were used on the IL-22 experimental aircraft designed by S. V. Il'yushin in 1946.

[8] TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 35, inv. 121331, file 1, sheet 50.

[9] Ibid., see also TsGANKh [Central State Archives for the National Economy], folio 8044, inv. 1, file unit 1182, sheet 47.

[10] TsGANKh, folio 8044, inv. 1, file unit 1183, sheet 2. The chief of the institute was P. Fedorov.

[11] TsAMO, folio 35, inv. 119112, file 1, sheet 15.

[12] These were basically modifications of aircraft from the prop motor group with jet boosters. Only S. A. Lavochkin was assigned to build a jet fighter with a Lyul'ka designed TRD.

[13] This engine surpassed the German "Walter" ZhRD used on the ME-163 aircraft and having a thrust of 1,200 kg.

[14] Serial production of the first Soviet MIG-9 and YaK-15 jet aircraft began in September-October 1946.

[15] The MIG-17 aircraft was built at the beginning of 1949. However, its serial production was held up. This commenced only in 1951.

[16] The IL-28 exceeded the piston-driven tactical bombers by almost 2-fold in terms of speed and range and by 3-fold in terms of payload. It was equipped with a radar which provided for navigation and bombing against invisible targets under instrument flying conditions.

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MILITARY HISTORY SEMINAR INSTRUCTION PLAN

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Information" as "An Aid to Teachers of Military History" by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col P. Bobylev: "Method of Conducting the Seminar 'Foreign Military Intervention in the Civil War in the USSR (1917-1920)'"]

[Text] The seminar on the given subject is the first of the seminars conducted by military history instructors. In addition to deepening the knowledge of the officer candidates, it must demonstrate to them the specific features of this type of exercise and encourage them to further actively study the subject.

In a seminar it is scarcely advisable to discuss the course of the Civil War period by period, since this leads, in our opinion, to a simple relating of facts, leaving little room for analysis, reflection and discussion. We would like to draw attention to the fact that the standard program provides for demonstrating in this subject the activities of V. I. Lenin as the organizer and leader of the armed struggle of the Soviet people and as the creator of the principles of Soviet military science.

Considering these particular features, the following seminar plan can be offered.

The training goal:

1) To show the basic areas of the military organizational activity of V. I. Lenin during the years of the Civil War;

2) To deepen the knowledge of the students on the questions of the particular features of conducting combat in the course of the Civil War and the genesis and development of Soviet troop tactics.

The basic questions of the seminar are:

1. The military organizational activity of V. I. Lenin during the years of the Civil War (abstract).

2. The most important particular features of the Civil War.

3. The development of Red Army tactics during the Civil War years.

An approximate calculation of the time: an introductory speech by the instructor up to 5 minutes, the first question (the abstract and its discussion) up to 20 minutes, the second question up to 30 minutes, the third question up to 20 minutes, and the final conclusion of the instructor and the summing up of the seminar up to 15 minutes.

In the introductory speech, the instructor should remind the officer candidates that a new age in the history of mankind began in October 1917.

With the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution a qualitatively new stage began in military history. From the very first days of its existence, the Soviet state was drawn into a Civil War for which international imperialism was to blame. The armed struggle in the defense of the socialist fatherland against the united forces of the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution on the basic fronts lasted until the middle of November 1920. In speaking at the 9th All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1921), V. I. Lenin summed up the final results of the Civil War. He pointed out: "...In the political and military area we have taken a world historical step which will go down in world history as the change of two ages."[1]

The instructor should then announce the subject and training goal, emphasizing the importance of the seminar and recalling the work procedure.

The officer candidate who is to give the abstract on the first question must be advised that for a period of 10-12 minutes he should take up the following areas in the military organizational activities of V. I. Lenin.

Lenin was a great military theoretician. In the abstract it is wise to point out that in the pre-October period and during the years of the Civil War, the leader particularly carefully studied military history. He was familiar with the works of Suvorov, Napoleon, Clausewitz and other military leaders, military theoreticians and historians. "It is silly not to know military history...,"[3] V. I. Lenin considered. Among the works written by him on the war, army and military science there are such outstanding ones as "The Fall of Port Arthur," "Socialism and War," "War and Revolution," "The Socialist Fatherland in Danger!" "Everyone in the Struggle Against Denikin!" "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Victory Over Kolchak" and many others. For the seminar it is possible to organize an exhibit of Lenin's works on military questions relating to the Civil War and to the defeat of the intervention.

V. I. Lenin proved to be an outstanding organizer of the defense of the Soviet republic during the years of the struggle against the interventionists and White Guards. The creation of the Red Army and its strengthening are linked to his name. He creatively determined the structure and tasks of the fundamentally new system of higher leadership bodies of national defense and directly participated in the organizing of its every level. Lenin personally headed the key bodies of this system: the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, the Soviet of People's Commissars and the Defense Council. He elaborated the major party and government documents on the questions of defending the Soviet republic and the turning of it into a military camp.

The leader of the revolution was an inspired military strategist. The military correspondence of V. I. Lenin convincingly shows that all the victories of the Red Army on the Civil War fronts are linked to his name. In the abstract it is possible to show how under Lenin's leadership the plans were worked out and implemented for defeating the forces of the internal and external counterrevolution (the examples can be found in the textbook).

The officer candidate giving the abstract must bring out all the listed ideas on four or five typed pages and present these at the seminar. The material on the given question can be found in the textbook, in the book "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces] (Voyenizdat, 1980, pp 257-271), "Grazhdanskaya Voyna v SSSR" [The Civil War in the USSR] (Vol 1, Voyenizdat, 1980) and in a number of other works.

After hearing and discussing the abstract, the instructor must make the necessary comments on its content and form as it will serve as a guide for the officer candidates who are to speak in subsequent seminars.

The discussion of the second question "The Most Important Particular Features of the Civil War" should be restricted to an examination of those particular features which had a direct influence on military art, and in particular on tactics. Certainly during the allotted time not more than three or four persons could speak and for this reason it is desirable to direct the conversation to the following particular features.

The opposition of class aims for the forces participating in the war determined its fierce, irreconcilable nature. In it there could be no half-way results or compromises between the classes. The question was strictly: who dominates whom? In emphasizing this, V. I. Lenin pointed out that the Civil War "dictates its own laws. The question is: Will capital rule or will the proletariat? There is no third solution."[5] For precisely this reason the most decisive and active forms of struggle were employed and the sides endeavored to fully defeat the enemy. Using the specific material given in the textbook, the officer candidates can bring out the given feature in terms of each period of the Civil War and thereby demonstrate the degree of their knowledge of the content of basic events on the fronts of the armed struggle.

It must be emphasized that the organization and development of the Soviet state's Armed Forces were carried out in the course of a war. In speaking on this problem it is desirable to bring out the fundamental differences in the organization of the belligerent armed forces. As is known, the White Guards created their formations under the patronage and with the direct aid of the interventionists. A large number of officers from the old army were in the counterrevolutionary camp. Also siding with them was a significant portion of the Cossacks who, in essence, were ready-trained troops. The principles adopted in the Tsarist Army lay at the basis of the organizational development of the counterrevolutionary armed forces and the old manuals were adhered to by the White Guard formations in the battles.

The difficulties of creating the armed forces of the proletarian state consisted in the fact that this problem had to be solved for the first time in history and in the course of a war. Under the leadership of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, the

Red Army was organized as a new type of army, a worker and peasant army. Naturally, in having a fundamentally new class content, it could not mechanically copy the organizational structure or the military art of the old army. At the same time, all the best from the military experience of the past was adopted, and particularly the experience of the Russian people. For dealing with this part of the second question, along with the textbook (pp 98-107), it is possible to use the book "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily. Istoriya stroitel'stva" [The Soviet Armed Forces. The History of Organizational Development] (Voyenizdat, 1978, pp 11-114).

Military operations during the Civil War years developed over enormous expanses. In the winter of 1919 the length of the front line reached 8,000 km and encompassed the Soviet republic on all sides. But the fronts were very little saturated with personnel and equipment. The textbook gives examples which illustrate well the existing situation (pp 112, 113, 115, 119, 124-125). The presence of exposed flanks for the belligerents and the use of the active forms of combat determined the fluid nature of the operations and engagements.

As is known, the development of military art depends primarily on two factors: weapons and personnel. The Red Army weapons qualitatively virtually did not differ from the weapons of the Russian Army from the period of World War I and it had extremely little weapons and military equipment. Even at the very end of the Civil War, the Red Army had just 4,888 guns of various systems, 539 aircraft in working order, 106 armored trains, armored platform cars and armored weapons, 94 tanks (including 80 that were captured) and 210 armored vehicles.[6] One might propose that the officer candidates compare these figures with the data on the amount of equipment involved in certain operations of World War I as given in the textbook (pp 86, 89, 92). It is essential to consider that the military equipment available to the Red Army could not be fully utilized due to the shortage of ammunition and fuel.

For this reason, the reason for the fundamental distinction of Soviet military art from the period of the Civil War from the military art of World War I must not be seen primarily in the weapons but rather in the Red Army personnel which surpassed the enemy in terms of moral-combat qualities and mass heroism. The revolutionary enthusiasm of the soldiers and commanders and their initiative contributed to the elaboration of new methods of combat which conformed most to the specific conditions. The instructor can recommend that the officer candidates demonstrate the significance of this factor under present-day conditions.

The third question, "The Development of Red Army Tactics During the Years of the Civil War" can be conveniently divided into subquestions, in which the particular features of tactics can be examined by the periods. The instructor's introductory comments on the given question in fact will be his conclusion on the previous one, where the factors influencing the development of tactics will be emphasized. It is wise to give also the following statement by M. V. Frunze: "The Red Army tactics have been and will be permeated with activeness in the sense of bold and energetically executed offensive operations. This stems from the class nature of the worker-peasant army and at the same time coincides with the requirements of military art."[7]

Material for analyzing the third question can be found in the textbook (pp 108, 112, 118-119, 125-127) as well as in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL (No 12, 1971, in the article by V. Kulikovskiy entitled "The Development of Red Army Tactics During the Civil War Years").

In the seminar it is important to see to it that the trainees in their speeches bring out the most characteristic traits of Red Army tactics during the various periods of the war. In 1918, tactics, in essence, had just been born. A characteristic trait of the offensive and defensive battles was the wide use of maneuvering. By the end of the war, when regular Red Army units and formations had been formed and definite tactical experience had been acquired, the Red Army field manual was worked out and this helped to establish a unity of tactical views and procedures. The content of the first Red Army regulations and the history of their elaboration can be found in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL (No 3, 1967, pp 3-14).

The year 1919 was characterized by a transition from semipartisan actions to engagements conducted according to a plan. On the offensive the tasks were given to the units and formations now both for objectives and for tactically important lines. In the autumn of 1919, for the first time a formation's task was divided into near and subsequent. On the tactical level there was a transition from the even allocation of resources along the front to their massing and operations by assault groups. In the defense of Petrograd, Ural'sk and other cities, extensive use was also made of engineer preparation of the terrain.

Further development of tactics occurred in 1920. In an offensive engagement the tasks were given to the units and formations basically by lines, the zones of advance were reduced and more often there was a deep configuration of the battle formations. While in the previous years the artillery was employed, as a rule, on a decentralized basis (allocated battery by battery to the regiments), in the war against the White Poles and Vrangel', artillery groups were organized. In the 33d Kuban' Division of the 15th Army on the Western Front, tanks were employed for the first time. In the tactics of defensive battle, much that was new was gained from the experience of defending the Kakhovka bridgehead by the units of the 51st Rifle Division. This included: the creation of a deep positional defense with a developed system of defensive works, the organization of an effective fire plan (including antitank) and so forth.

In summing up the discussion of the last question, the instructor must emphasize that Red Army tactics, like its military art as a whole, was in the process of development and certain of its questions had not yet finally been formulated. However, it demonstrated its superiority over the tactics of the interventionists and White Guards. The experience of the Civil War lay at the basis of the further development of Red Army tactics.

In drawing a general conclusion on the seminar, the instructor must assess the speeches by the officer candidates, note the positive aspects and the shortcomings of the speeches (again considering that this is the first seminar) and assign the problems for independent work on the subject.

FOOTNOTES

[1] V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 324.

[2] [Not in text.]

[3] Ibid., Vol 36, p 31.

[4] [Not in text.]

[5] "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biographical Chronicle], Vol 6, Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p 538.

[6] N. N. Azovtsev, "V. I. Lenin i Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka" [V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science], Moscow, Nauka, 1971, p 84.

[7] M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya"[Selected Works], Voyenizdat, 1977, p 71.

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BOOK REVIEW: SOVIET VOLUNTEER PILOTS IN CHINA

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[Book review by Hero of the Soviet Union, Prof and Mar Avn S. Krasovskiy: "Soviet Volunteer Pilots in China"]

[Text] The Izdatel'stvo Nauka has published an interesting collection of memoirs by Soviet volunteer pilots who fought in China at the end of the 1930's and the start of the 1940's.[1] The selfless aid of the Soviet Union in all stages of the Chinese people's national liberation struggle against the Japanese invaders is a vivid example of the Soviet Union carrying out its international duty. This was expressed in the passing on of experience in the revolutionary struggle and socialist construction, in moral-political support, in economic assistance, in defending the interests of China on the international scene, in training personnel and in direct military aid.

The sharp upsurge in the national liberation movement in China during the first quarter of the 20th century developed into the anti-imperialist revolution of 1925-1927. The Soviet state provided great support to the Chinese revolutionary forces. The political and military advisers headed by such prominent party and military figures as M. M. Borodin, P. A. Pavlov, V. K. Blyukher and others, helped to unify the united anti-imperialist front, to form the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) and to successfully carry out the Long March which became the major event of the revolution (p 3).

By the start of the Long March (1926-1927), a group was formed from the volunteers who represented flight and technical personnel. It included A. M. Kravtsov, V. Ye. Sergeyev (the chief of the air group), Tal'berg, Bazenau, Kostyuchenko, Kazyura, Pakov and others, a total of around 20 men. In addition, the Soviet pilots and aviation technicians were part of the volunteer pilots of the Kalgan Group. Among them were Stepanov, Pyatnitskiy and Shestakov.[2] Our pilots provided great tactical aid to the Chinese revolutionary troops.

Ten years later, militaristic Japan began to implement its plans to seize China. The economic backwardness and the lack of a sufficient amount of foreign exchange did not allow China to supply its army with the essential military equipment and weapons. At the start of the war, the Japanese troops surpassed the Chinese army by 4-5-fold in terms of various types of guns, by 13-fold for aviation and by 36-fold for tanks.[3]

The Chinese people rose to defend their motherland. On their side were the sympathy, all-round aid and support of the Soviet people. From October 1937 through September 1939, China received from the USSR 985 aircraft, 82 tanks, more than 1,300 artillery guns, over 14,000 machine guns, ammunition, equipment and supplies.[4] In line with the total blockade on the Chinese coast at the outset of the war, the vehicle track from Alma-Ata to Lanzhou some 3,000 km long was turned into a "lifeline" for China.

In the middle of February 1939, 3,665 Soviet military specialists were working in China and participating in the struggle against the Japanese aggressors.[5] Among our advisors sent to China were M. I. Dratvin, V. I. Chuykov, P. S. Rybalko, P. F. Batitskiy, A. I. Cherepanov, A. Ya. Kalyagin and others. The material support from the Soviet Union became a major factor in China's rebuff to the Japanese militarists. The most essential aid was given to Chinese aviation which had in fact lost its importance as a consequence of the high losses even by the end of 1937.

"There was a war on, but the Chinese people were left without aviation and flight personnel. Very likely this was one of the most dramatic moments in the period of the Japanese-Chinese war. Seemingly a catastrophe was inevitable. The Japanese aviation which was unchallenged in the air literally demoralized not only the population of the unprotected cities but also the troops on the battlefield. Who knows what would have happened if there had not been the prompt aid of the Soviet Union."[6]

In response to the urgent request of the Chinese side, in September 1937, the Soviet government approved a decision to send aircraft to China. This was first-rate aviation equipment for those times and included: the I-15 and I-16 fighters, the SB high-speed bombers and the DB-3 long-range bombers. As a total in 1937-1941, China received 1,250 aircraft from the USSR (p 7).

The highest manifestation of internationalism in terms of the struggling Chinese people was the dispatching of Soviet volunteer pilots to China. They took a direct part in the combat operations. Among the defenders of the Chinese skies who demonstrated high examples of skill and courage, valor and heroism were the authors of the reviewed collection: F. P. Polynin, A. G. Rytov, M. G. Machin, D. A. Kudymov, A. Z. Dushin, N. G. Kozlov, F. I. Dobysh, Ya. P. Prokof'yev, A. I. Pushkin, S. V. Slyusarev, I. P. Selivanov, A. K. Korchagin, V. D. Zemlyanskiy, K. K. Kokkinaki and S. Ya. Fedorov.

In October 1937, there began operating the "air bridge" between Alma-Ata--Lanzhou--Hankou over which the first two squadrons with personnel of 254 men were ferried into China (p 7). The squadron of SB high-speed bombers was under the command of N. M. Kidalinskiy and the squadron of I-16 fighters was commanded by G. M. Prokof'yev. In November 1937, a second group of SB bombers was dispatched to China under the command of F. P. Polynin. It also included pilots from the Transbaykal area who flew their aircraft to China across Mongolia over the new route of Irkutsk --Suzhou--Lanzhou--Hankou. The Transbaykal pilots were under the command of G. I. Tkhor who not long before this had returned from Republican Spain.

At the end of 1937 and the start of 1938, a squadron of I-15 fighters under the command of A. S. Blagoveshchenskiy arrived in China in three groups, and at the end of February 1938, an air group of 40 fighters under the command of G. M. Zakharov.[7]

During the summer of the same year, G. I. Tkhor led a new squadron of SB to Hankou from the Transbaykal area and in June of the following year there arrived the subunits of DB-3A long-distance bombers under the command of G. A. Kulishenko and N. A. Kozlov. At the same time two fighter squadrons of S. P. Suprun and K. K. Kokkinaki were in China.

The Soviet volunteer pilots, the number of which gradually increased, comprised a significant force. They fought courageously for the freedom of the Chinese people and made a special contribution to strengthening the defense capability of China. "For the Chinese people there appeared in the skies not only a reliable shield but also a cutting sword."[8] Even by the autumn and winter of 1937, an end had been put to the impunity of the barbarian Japanese raids.

The military chronicle of the Soviet volunteer pilots started on 1 November 1937, when seven of our I-16 fighters, having scarcely landed in Nanking, engaged 20 Japanese aircraft, shooting down two bombers and a fighter.

On 1 December 1937, the Soviet fighter pilots five times took to the air, blocking the way for the Japanese bombers to Nanking, and on the following day the SB bombers made their first raid on Shanghai. I. N. Kozlov, M. M. Anosov, F. I. Dobysh and others bombed the Japanese naval ships in the Shanghai roadstead. One cruiser was sunk and six other ships were damaged.[9] On the same day D. A. Kudymov, M. G. Machin and others bombed the Shanghai airfield, destroying the basic number of aggressor aircraft on the ground. They won a victory which the Chinese pilots could not even dream of.

During February 1938, the Soviet volunteers made major strikes against the aggressor. The bomber crews of V. I. Klevtsov, N. I. Novodranov, S. Ya. Fedorov, Ya. P. Prokof'yev and many others particularly distinguished themselves. The Soviet volunteer pilots quickly mastered the theater of war and enemy tactics. They worked constantly to win air supremacy, in dispelling the myth of the invincibility of Japanese aviation.

The group of F. P. Polynin made a daring raid on the island of Taiwan on 23 February 1938, attacking the Japanese Navy base near Taipei. The commander of the group recalls: "In three successive strikes from the air we caused tangible losses to the Japanese. According to agent data, they lost 40 aircraft (not counting those which were in containers); the hangars caught fire as well as a 3-year supply of fuel."[10]

The volunteer pilots carried out unprecedented heroic feats in the air battles over Wuhan. Thus, on 29 April 1938, on the birthday of the Japanese emperor, 54 enemy aircraft made a massed raid on the city, but received a crushing rebuff. As a result 21 enemy aircraft were shot down with a loss of 5 Chinese airplanes. In a raid on Wuhan 2 days later the Japanese lost another 14 aircraft (p 10). In July-October 1938, the Soviet aces sunk 92 enemy ships and damaged 16 (p 11).

According to the official data, by the start of 1940, the Japanese invaders had lost 986 aircraft and this was inseparably linked to the heroic efforts of the Soviet volunteers (p 10). Their heroism and self-sacrifice in the struggle for the freedom of the Chinese people won the affection and respect of the simple Chinese. The Soviet pilots honorably carried out their sacred international duty and, in performing miracles of heroism and self-sacrifice in the Chinese skies, carried on their shoulders the basic burden of many air engagements.

The successful actions of the Soviet volunteers largely depended on the fact that highly trained aviation commanders were the advisors of the Chinese air command and the organizers of combat operations. These commanders included: P. N. Anisimov, P. F. Zhigarev, F. P. Polynin, A. G. Rytov, P. V. Rychagov, G. I. Tkhor, T. T. Khryukin and S. Ya. Fedorov.

The most outstanding Soviet volunteer pilots, military advisors and instructors were given high governmental decorations and 14 of them (F. P. Polynin, V. V. Zverev, A. S. Blagoveshchenskiy, O. N. Borovikov, A. A. Gubenko, S. S. Gaydarenko, T. T. Khryukin, G. P. Kravchenko, S. V. Slyusarev, S. P. Suprun, M. N. Marchenkov, Ye. M. Nikolayenko, N. P. Selivanov and I. S. Sukhov) were given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.[11] More than 200 courageous Soviet pilots died a death of the brave devoting their life to the liberty and national independence of the Chinese people. These included: Vorob'yev, A. Rakhmanov, the volunteer pilots F. Gurley, I. Gurov, D. Kuleshin, V. Pesotskiy, N. Terekhov and many others (p 12). They were buried on Chinese land. The simple people of China considered their graves sacred.

The participation of Soviet volunteer pilots in the war for the liberty and independence of the Chinese people was an example of the selfless aid and loyalty of the Soviet people to their international duty. At present the Beijing falsifiers of history are endeavoring to underplay or even refute this truth from the eve and start of World War II as well as the fact of the crucial role played by the Soviet Union in the liberation of China from under the yoke of the Japanese militarists in the concluding campaign of this war in the Far East where the Soviet Armed Forces played the main role in defeating the Kwantung Army.

The author of the given review, as a participant of many events in China of a later period, would like to supplement the memoirs of the former volunteer pilots by stating that many years later the Soviet Union, in unswervingly defending Marxist-Leninist positions, continued to provide the Chinese people with all-round selfless aid both before and after the formation of the PRC. Our aid strengthened the defense capability of China and cemented Soviet-Chinese friendship. But the Chinese hegemonists have a short memory. Having betrayed the ideals of communism, they have openly set out on the path of siding with imperialism and on the path of preparing for war against the USSR.

The collection "V nebe Kitaya" has been published at the very moment that the Chinese leaders have endeavored to hide the truth and deny what once was. It recalls the treacherous betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism and communist ideals by the present Chinese leaders.

Of course, the book is not devoid of shortcomings. It could have gained significantly if it were better illustrated. There are repetitions of certain events although this is explainable. The authors were the participants or witnesses of the same events, they were in the company of the same people and carried out identical tasks.

In conclusion we would like to point out that a valuable book has been published which truthfully deals with the heroic feats of the Soviet aviators who fought courageously in the Chinese skies in 1937-1940. It will be of great benefit in military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet youth. The collection will be of particular interest for military aviators who are endeavoring to follow in the footsteps of their grandfathers and fathers who fought heroically for the sake of carrying out their international duty.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "V nebe Kitaya. 1937-1940. Vospominaniya Sovetskikh letchikov-dobrovol'tsev" [In the Skies of China. 1937-1940. Recollections of the Soviet Volunteer Pilots], Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 384 pages.

[2] A. Ya. Kalyagin, "Po neznakomym dorogam" [Over Unknown Roads], Moscow, Nauka, 1979, pp 11-12.

[3] A. B. Borodin, "Pomoshch' SSSR kitayskomu narodu v antiyaponskoy voyny 1937-1941" [Soviet Aid to the Chinese People in the Anti-Japanese War of 1937-1941], Moscow, Mysl', 1965, p 146.

[4] "Istoriya vtoroy Mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1974, p 72.

[5] Ibid., p 73.

[6] A. Ya. Kalyagin, Op. cit., p 85.

[7] Ibid.

[8] F. P. Polynin, "Boyevyye marshruty" [Combat Routes], Voyenizdat, 1972, p 46.

[9] I. Ya. Kalyagin, Op. cit., pp 86-87.

[10] F. P. Polynin, Op. cit., pp 67-68.

[11] "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny," Vol 2, p 73.

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BOOK REVIEW: HISTORY OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 81 (signed to press 24 Feb 81) pp 82-83

[Book review by Prof and Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Beskrovnyy: "From the History of the Foreign Policy of Russia"]

[Text] The next volume of documents from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been published.[1] It includes 219 archival documents which have appeared for the first time in scholarly use as well as 159 documents (ukases, decrees and protocols on boundary demarcation) which were previously published in various additions. They have been given in excerpts and some of the documents of an explanatory nature have been analyzed in commentaries. The materials included in the volume provide a full understanding of the nature and content of the foreign policy activities of the Russian government during the first quarter of the 19th Century. The basic content of the published collection deals with questions of concern to the governments of the Central European states in 1819-1821. The fundamental problem of that time was the struggle for the establishing of legitimism (monarchical, reactionary regimes) in Europe. The rulers of these states on the basis of the Aachen Congress of 1818, contrary to the interests of the peoples, endeavored to maintain their feudal privileges.

At the beginning of the 1820's, the revolutionary movement in Western Europe continued to be active. The leaders of the Holy Alliance which was set up by the Aachen Congress were certain that it had become impossible to solve the social and political problems by the methods of "constitutional diplomacy." It had not withstood the clash with the constitutional democratic demands which were being put forward by the people from below.

February 1820. In Spain a revolution had broken out and 4 months later it also struck Naples. Under the pressure of the revolutionary Neopolitan masses of people, King Ferdinand I was forced to introduce a constitution following the Spanish model.

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[1] "Vneshnyaya politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty rossiyskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del" [Russian Foreign Policy of the 18th and Beginning of the 20th Centuries. Documents of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Vol 3 (11). May 1819-February 1821. Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 880 pages.

This startled the reactionary forces of Europe, particularly the Austrian government which was concerned for its own possessions in Lombardy.

In October 1820, at Troppau (presently the city of Opava in Czechoslovakia), a congress of five powers assembles (Russia, Austria, Prussia, France and England) which granted themselves the right and legitimacy of the final measures which possibly must be undertaken against the growing revolutionary movement in Europe (pp 591-592). A month later it was decided to carry out a counterrevolutionary intervention in Spain while Naples was occupied by Austrian troops. In March 1821, the Austrian Army began the actual execution of the decisions taken by the leaders of the Holy Alliance. In April it cruelly suppressed the revolutionary actions in Naples and Piedmont having restored the absolutist orders.

In closing the congress on 14 (26) February 1821, its participants confirmed their overtly reactionary forms of relations with the other nations while the Holy Alliance openly assumed the functions of the "policeman of Europe."

Of great interest to the specialists, historians and readers concerned with the history of Russian diplomacy will be the documents characterizing the diplomatic relations between Russia and Iran and Russia and Turkey as well as the minutes of meetings with the diplomatic representatives of the European states, the countries of the Near and Middle East, and the reports and briefings by the official representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Russian policy in the Far East and the Pacific is reflected in the documents devoted to the activities of the Russo-American Company. Although the materials show the good will of Russia toward the United States, the Russian government was forced to deal cautiously with the attempts of the English and American industrialists to penetrate the north of the Far East. The Ministry of Finances protested a contract concluded by the chief of Kamchatskaya Oblast, P. I. Rikord, concerning the right of American whalers to hunt whales under the Russian flag.

Of significant interest are the documents describing the attitude of the Russian government to the liberation movement on the American Continent. It saw in the United States a counterweight to England in the New World and supported the United States in the settlement of the disputes with Spain over Florida. The Russian government also assisted in the recognition of Haitian independence by France.

The internal situation in the country had a substantial influence on Russian foreign policy. This was complicated as a consequence of the growing dissatisfaction of the masses with the serf-owning regime. The revolt of the Semenovskiy regiment on 16-17 October 1820 was a real shock for the Tsarist government. Concerned by this event, it endeavored to keep it of a local nature. "It is important," wrote the secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, K. V. Nessel'rode, to the Russian ambassadors in Austria and Germany, "that this event not be depicted by the newspapers in a false light and not cause any erroneous assumptions, particularly at present when our detractors and the liberals are endeavoring to use the slightest incident, whatever the reasons causing it, for their own purposes" (p 588). The emperor Alexander I in a letter to A. A. Arakcheyev saw the cause of the disturbances which had commenced in the Semenovskiy Guards Regiment in the political influence of the secret societies which were "in contact between themselves and find very unpleasant our association and the work in Troppau" (p 589).

In actuality this revolt showed the increased struggle against serfdom in Russia. It had an enormous impression upon the participants of the secret Decembrist societies. The latter viewed the struggle against the autocracy not only as an internal task for the nation but also as an important factor in the European revolutionary movement. The Russian officers favoring the revolution were against the counterrevolutionary policy of the Holy Alliance and its congresses which were aimed at suppressing the revolutionary movement in Spain and Naples.

Alexander I was alarmed by the report from the commander of the guards corps I. V. Vasil'chikov on the impossibility of sending out Russian troops to suppress the revolutionary movement in Naples and Piedmont. The officers did not want to move against the Neopolitans.... A revolution in thinking already existed and the only means not to swamp the ship was not to put up more sail than the wind permitted. The fear of the revolutionary influence on the army became the main reason that Alexander I refused to send Russian troops into Italy for "restoring order."

A positive aspect of the reviewed volume is the presence of sound commentaries drawn up on the basis of the archival documents. The subject, name and geographic indices will be of great help to the researchers and readers.

The putting of a large amount of new documents and materials into scholarly circulation will contribute to a profound study of international relations in the first quarter of the 19th century.

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ANSWERS TO READERS QUESTIONS ON MILITARY HISTORY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 81 (signed to press 24 Feb 81) pp 85-86

[Unattributed replies to questions from readers on military history published under the heading "You Ask--We Answer"]

[Text] [Question] Please tell us, asks P. P. Kuleshov (Pereval'sk, Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast), who successively headed the Air Force of the Soviet Union from the first days of Soviet power up to the present.

[Answer] On 20 December 1917, as part of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, an All-Russian Board was established (with a membership of 10 persons) to manage the Air Force of the Republic (VFR). The professional revolutionary and aviation engineer and pilot, K. V. Akashev was appointed the chairman of the board.

On 24 May 1918, the All-Russian Board to Manage the VFR was abolished and the Main Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Air Force (Glavvozdukhflot) was formed. It was headed by a council consisting of the chief of Glavvozdukhflot, the mechanical engineer M. A. Solovov and two commissars.

In September 1918, the Field Directorate for Aviation and Aeronautics of the Operational Army (Aviadarm) was created under the staff of the Republic RVS [Revolutionary Military Soviet]. Its chief was A. V. Sergeyev, a pilot from among the soldiers and a party member since 1911. The questions of organizing and supplying the air units remained with Glavvozdukhflot.

At the end of 1921, in line with the elimination of the fronts, Aviadarm was abolished. The Main Air Force Directorate became the sole body for leadership of the aviation. In 1924, it was reorganized into the Air Force Directorate of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] which was under the Republic RVS. The chief of the Air Force Directorate was simultaneously a member of the RVS. In 1939, the Air Force Directorate was transformed into the Main Air Force Directorate.

In the interwar period, the Soviet Air Force was headed successively by: A. V. Sergeyev (1921-1922), A. A. Znamenskiy (1922-1923), A. P. Rozengol'ts (1923-1924), P. I. Baranov (1924-1931), Arm Com 2d Rank (from 1935) Ya. I. Alksnis (1931-1937), Arm Com 2d Rank A. D. Loktionov (1937-1939), Corps Com (from 4 June 1940, Lt Gen Avn)

Ya. V. Smushkevich (1939-1940), Lt Gen Avn P. V. Rychagov (1940-1941) and Lt Gen Avn P. F. Zhigarev (from May 1941).

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, by a decision of Hq SHC of 29 June, the position of air force commander and deputy people's commissar of defense was established. Lt Avn P. F. Zhigarev was assigned to this position and subsequently (April 1942-1946) Col Gen (Mar and then Chief Mar) Avn A. A. Novikov.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, in 1946, the position of commander-in-chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy minister of the Armed Forces (later deputy minister of defense) was introduced. The Air Force commanders-in-chief have been: Mar Avn (from 8 May 1959, Chief Mar Avn) K. A. Vershinin (1946-1949; 1957-1969); Col Gen Avn (from 3 August 1953, Mar Avn and from 11 March 1955, Chief Mar Avn) P. F. Zhigarev (1949-1957). Since 1969, the Air Force has been headed by Mar Avn (from 3 November 1972, Chief Mar Avn) P. S. Kutakhov.

[Question] Our readers K. I. Ivantsev (Kazan'), P. S. Sukharev (Krasnoyarsk), P. P. Kuleshov (Pereval'sk, Voroshilovgradskaya Oblast), A. M. Morozov (Kuybyshev) and others are interested in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Tell us, request, for example, A. M. Morozov and P. P. Kuleshov, how the structure of the superior military leadership of the Soviet Republic changed during the period of 1917-1924.

[Answer] The central control organ of the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR Ministry (People's Commissariat) of Defense, dates its history from the Committee on Military and Naval Affairs formed by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 26 October (8 November) 1917. It was in charge of the Ground, Naval and Air Forces of the Soviet Republic. Its membership initially included the members of the Petrograd VRK [Military-Revolutionary Committee], V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, N. V. Krylenko and P. Ye. Dybenko.

On 9 November, the Committee upon the proposal of V. I. Lenin added representatives from the Military Organization under the central committee of the RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolshevik)] (Voyenki) and the VRK, and was given the name Soviet of People's Commissars for Military and Naval Affairs. Soon thereafter the Soviet was transformed into the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs headed by the board of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (formed on 23 November (6 December) 1917). P. Ye. Dybenko, N. V. Krylenko and N. I. Podvoyskiy joined the board as people's commissars for military affairs.

In January 1918, the Narkomvoyendel [People's Commissariat for Military Affairs] was divided into two people's commissariats, one for military affairs (N. V. Krylenko and N. I. Podvoyskiy) and the other for naval affairs (P. Ye. Dybenko). By a decree of the SNK [Soviet of People's Commissars] of 4 March 1918, the Higher Military Council was established and this was the first higher body of strategic leadership over the Soviet Republic's Armed Forces. It directed the people's commissariats for military and naval affairs. The Higher Military Council included the military leader, he was also the chairman (M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich) as well as two political commissars (P. P. Prosh'yan and K. I. Shutko). On 18 March, the leftist SR P. P. Prosh'yan was expelled from the Higher Military Council when the leftist SRs withdrew from the government.

On 19 March, at an enlarged session of the SNK, under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin, again the question was reviewed of the tasks of the Higher Military Council. The membership of the Higher Military Council was established: the people's commissar for military affairs (he was also to be the chairman), the people's commissar for naval affairs, two specialists in military affairs and one specialist in naval affairs who possessed military knowledge and combat experience.

By a decree of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], the Higher Military Council of the Republic was abolished and in its place on 2 September 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVS) was established. This became the collective organ of higher military power in the RSFSR. The people's commissar for military and naval affairs was the RVS chairman.

On 30 November 1918, by a decree of the RSFSR VTsIK, the Soviet of Worker and Peasant Defense was formed under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin. This was an extraordinary higher military body for directing the armed defense of the Soviet state during the years of the Civil War and military intervention. At the beginning of April 1920, it was renamed the Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO). It existed up to 28 April 1937.

[Question] Please provide us with the addresses of the publishing houses, request Ya. P. Gabuniya (Gudava, Abkhazian ASSR), K. T. Yakin (Saransk) and other readers, which publish literature on military-patriotic and military history themes as well as illustrated albums and posters.

[Answer] Literature on the designated subjects is printed at virtually all publishing houses, both the central and local ones.

We will give the addresses of the basic central publishing houses which publish books on military history subjects, the recollections of military chiefs, memoirs as well as illustrated albums:

1) Politicheskoye Izdatel'stvo [Politizdat]: 125811, GSP, Moscow, Miusskaya Square No 7;

2) Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo [Voyenizdat]: 103160, Moscow, K-160, Voyenizdat Administration;

3) Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF SSSR: 129272, Moscow, Trifonovskaya Street No 34, Building 2A;

4) Izdatel'stvo Nauka: 117864, GSP-7, Moscow, V-487, Profsoyuznaya 90;

5) Izdatel'stvo Mysl': 117071, Moscow, V-71, Leninskiy Prospect 15;

6) Izdatel'stvo Planeta: 103031, Moscow, K-31, Petrovka Street, 8/11.

[Question] Where can one pay to have made various photographs (reproductions) of monuments, portraits of military chiefs and diagrams, S. A. Zenyukov (Mednikovo, Kaluzhskaya Oblast) would like to know.

[Answer] Orders for reproductions of pictures, drawings, diagrams and photographs can be submitted to the State Library imeni V. I. Lenin (101100, Moscow 100, Kalininskiy Prospect 3. Photocopy Department). Payment for services is C.O.D. It is advisable to seek advice on the nature of the work, date of execution and fees from the Photocopy Department by mail or by telephone (202-16-32).

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